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Organizations tend to follow two common practices. First, they seek out and 
recruit the best and the brightest, with the assumption that these high performers create 
value and drive success within the organization. Second, they increasingly rely upon 
workgroups and teams to accomplish organizational goals. Though each practice alone 
has merit, their interaction seems problematic. Organizational leaders invest substantial 
resources to recruit standouts, yet also want high performers to seamlessly embed within, 
and contribute to, workgroups and teams. I am intrigued to consider several puzzles that 
seem to exist where these trends intersect. How are high performers received by peers 
their workgroup? How do high performers influence the motivation of their teammates? 
What impact will high performers have on team collaboration and coordination? This 
dissertation seeks to address these and related questions. In three essays, I develop a 
	  
	  
theory of consequences of outperformance, focusing on implications for the high 
performer, his or her peers, and the team as a whole. 
In Essay 1, I offer a theoretical and empirical account of how high performers are 
socially treated by their peers. I identify prosocial (i.e., other-oriented) characteristics of 
the high performer and of the social environment that can mitigate unfavorable social 
behaviors from peers. In Essay 2, I examine how the presence of a high performer affects 
the proactive motivation and performance of lower-performing teammates. I also explore 
individual characteristics that make teammate motivation more or less susceptible to the 
presence of a high performer. In Essay 3, I explore how the composition of members’ 
past performance impacts team processes. I argue that steeper differences in performance 
histories galvanize social order, which can facilitate coordination among members yet 
reduce dynamic collaboration—both of which are critical to team innovation. Using a 
multi-method approach, I examine these hypotheses using field studies, individual 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The Meeting of Two Trends: Talent Wars and the Rise of Relational Work 
At the onset of the dot-com boom, Steven Hankins, senior partner in one of the 
world’s premier consulting firm, coined phrase the “war for talent” to describe the 
dogged recruitment and retention of high performers. While the intensity with which “the 
war” wages has ebbed and flowed with the economic landscape (Schwartz, Barry, & 
Liakopoulos, 2013), most recruitment efforts still focus on stars, high performers, or best 
athletes (i.e., individuals whose past performance exceeds their peers; Becker & Huselid, 
2006; Groysberg, Lee, & Nanda, 2008; Sackett & Lievens, 2008). For organizational 
leaders, acquisition of high performers remains at the top of the strategic agenda and is 
often equated to subsequent success (Guthridge, Komm, & Lawson, 2008; Lepak & 
Snell, 2002; Michaels, Handfield-Jones, & Axelrod, 2001). For example, research of 
outperformers (i.e., those at the top of the performance distribution) in science fields 
found them exponentially more valuable to their firms compared to lower performers 
(Ernst, Leptein, & Vitt, 2000). The pursuit of stars stays especially prevalent in 
organizations whose environment is dynamic or regularly requires innovation, and who 
focus on continuous improvement of service to clients so as to remain the provider-of-
choice; these organizations span professional services firms, sports teams, engineering 
firms, R&D teams, hospitals systems, and academic departments (Deloitte Human 
Capital, 2008; Groysberg, Polzer, & Elfenbein, 2011).  
In tandem, organizations increasingly utilize of groups and team to accomplish 




especially when competitive advantage necessitates innovation from its workforce 
(Anderson, De Dreu & Nijstad, 2004; Ford, 1996; Hülsheger, Anderson, & Salgado, 
2009). The rise in research on teamwork has advanced understanding of team states and 
processes that promote team effectiveness (i.e., Kozlowski, Gully, Nason, & Smith, 1999; 
Marks, Mathieu, & Zaccaro, 2001). Yet, most models have been insensitive to the social 
ordering that naturally results from members’ performance differences, which results in 
disparity (i.e., composition of differences on socially-valued attributes or resources; 
Harrison & Klein, 2007). 
This seems a critical omission given that (1) employee performance histories 
serve as potent signals of status (Berger, Fiske, Norman, & Zelditch, 1977), and that (2) 
social hierarchies quickly emerge in the absence of formal hierarchies (Ridgeway & 
Walker, 1995; Tiedens, Unzueta, & Young, 2007), which is increasingly often the case in 
workgroups and team environments (Langfred, 2004; Lawler, Mohrman, & Ledford, 
1995). Status reflects level of respect and prominence individuals receive from others 
(Anderson, Kraus, Galinsky, & Keltner, 2012; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003; 
Magee & Galinsky, 2008). It is fundamentally a “positional or relational element of a 
social structure” (Washington & Zajac, 2005: 282). I argue that the level, pattern, and 
salience of performance differences exert strong and meaningful forces on the social 
hierarchy in workgroups and team. Performance differences operate as disparity, which 
invites a host of social dynamics important to the functioning of a group and the 
experiences of its members. For example, research offers account for how disparity can 
spark competition, comparison, and resentment between colleagues (Hambrick & Mason, 




Despite the headhunters chase stars and the increased need to embed employees 
within supportive workgroups and collaborative teams, we lack understanding of how 
high performers—and the performance disparity their presence creates—influence 
motivation and social interactions among peers. Sharper understanding of how high 
performers affect colleagues and their teams therefore seems an important complement to 
current theoretical insights as well as efforts to inform practice.  
 
Dissertation Statement of Purpose and Summary of Studies 
In this dissertation, I seek to develop and test a multilevel theory of consequences 
of outperformers. In three essays, I investigate how high performers—and the 
performance disparities they create—impact their social treatment, peer motivation and 
proactivity, and team processes and, ultimately the facets of innovation. From a practical 
standpoint, it seems valuable to examine whether recruitment goals and staffing decision 
may invite hidden consequences. The impetus driving this body of research is not to 
dissuade the pursuit of talented employees or team members, but rather generate 
awareness of these consequences and identify potential solutions that can mitigate them. 
To the extent that business leaders are aware of unintended consequences of performance 
disparity, they are better informed to make decisions. From a theoretical standpoint, this 
collection of studies offers several opportunities to consider how theories of motivation 
and status can be integrated into the developing discussion of dynamics within 
workgroups and teams.  
Essay 1 considers how high performance can trigger social consequences for the 




theories, I developed with my collaborators, Hui Liao, Aichia Chuang, Jing Zhou, and 
Yuntao Dong, a theoretical model that consider how peers treat fellow colleagues based 
upon performance, and investigate mechanisms driving peers social behaviors toward 
high performers. Exploring boundary conditions, my co-authors and I examine prosocial 
(i.e., other-oriented) characteristics—both of performers and of the social context—that 
moderate these effects. We adopted a multi-method approach.  First, we conducted a 
scenario-based experiment pilot study to initially examine our theoretical contention: that 
higher performers create a motivational tension for their colleagues—they are 
simultaneously beneficial and threatening. Building on this evidence, we test our 
theoretical model used a multi-method approach, using first a multilevel, multisource, 
and time-lagged field study in a chain of 80 Taiwanese salons comprised of 300 stylists 
(Study A). Then, we replicated and extend our findings using a team lab study in a 
controlled context (Study B). Results from both studies indicated that peers considered 
higher performers both more beneficial and threatening to work resources, which in turn 
influenced the extent to which performers were socially supported or were socially 
undermined. High performers who were also high in prosocial motives buffered 
themselves from being undermined, while cooperative contexts did not serve as a 
sufficient condition to balance out favorable treatment of higher performers. Findings 
offer a picture of why high performers often find it “lonely at the top” and offers a 
potential avenue for how they may improve upon the social treatment they experience 
from peers at work. 
Essay 2 shifts the focus of consequences to those faced by the peers in a high 




that consider how the presence of a high performer can affect peer proactive motivation 
and proactive performance. I also explore how the presence of a high performer serves as 
an important moderating context that affects whether peers’ proactive disposition will 
materialize proactive performance. To test this model, I executed a multi-study approach. 
First, I conducted a team lab in which some teams had a high performer and some teams 
did not to examine how this presence affected peers’ contributions (Study C). Second, I 
conducted a study that simulated a team context, which offered increased internal 
validity, enabled measurement of motivational mechanisms driving proactive 
contributions, and facilitated more objective measure of proactive performance (Study 
D). Results from these studies converged to reveal that having a high performer in the 
team can creates a strong situation that significantly impacts whether peers’ natural traits 
are expressed and translate into performance.  
Essay 3 broadens the focus on the impact of a high performer to the collective 
work team. Here, I examined the effects of the performance disparity among members 
that the addition of high performers naturally increases. Integrating literature on status 
hierarchies with theories of team creativity and innovation, I build a model that considers 
how performance disparity among members in design teams can prove both helpful and 
limiting to teams’ innovative goals—through different team process mechanisms. To 
explain this phenomenon, I introduce the concept of social concern in teams, differentiate 
it from related concepts, and detail how it can dampen creativity while fueling efficiency. 
To test my hypotheses, I rely upon an experimental study of teams working on an open-




participation to maximize team creativity (i.e., generation and sharing of new and useful 
ideas) and efficient, convergent participation to turn creative ideas into tangible products.  
Through my three essays, I endeavor to explain how the introduction of high 
performers to workgroups or teams can invite paradoxical social consequences for the 
performer, motivational consequences for peers, and contrasting process consequences 
for teams. Taken together, I propose to offer theoretical and empirical accounts that can 
inform business and human resources leaders alike of additional benefits but also hidden 
costs that may be incurred with the introduction of high performers. I also offer 
consideration of boundary conditions that may help to offset social, motivational, and 
collaborative costs.  
The rest of this proposal unfolds as follows. In each subsequent chapter, I will 
frame the central question(s) addressed, articulate intended theoretical contributions, and 
review relevant theory from which I develop my hypotheses. Then, I describe in detail 
the research design of each investigation and review the analytical approach and results. 
Lastly, I offer a discussion of key implications of findings, theoretical contributions, and 
practical value of each essay. Appendices, Tables, and Figures follow in support of these 








CHAPTER 2: ESSAY 1 – HOT SHOTS AND COOL RECEPTION: SOCIAL 
CONSEQUENCES OF HIGH PERFORMANCE AT WORK 
 
Elizabeth M. Campbell, Hui Liao,  
Aichia Chuang, Jing Zhou, and Yuntao Dong 
 
Under journal revision 
 
SECTION 2.1: INTRODUCTION & CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT 
Business leaders spend significant time strategizing how to motivate exceptional 
performance (Latham & Pinder, 2005) and how to attract, hire, and retain individuals 
expected to perform at exceptional levels—the proverbial “best and the brightest” 
(Schmitt, Cortina, Ingerick, & Wiechmann, 2003). Identifying, motivating, and retaining 
high performers (i.e., individuals who contribute a high level of performance relative to 
the work unit’s average) in turn, dominates discussion within management research 
(Sackett & Lievens, 2008), and prompts talent wars among organizations (Deloitte 
Human Capital, 2008; Michaels, Handfield-Jones, & Axelrod, 1997; Sutton, 2007). 
Within the literature, focus on determinants of performance eclipses understanding of 
consequences (Burke, 1982). Understandably, most studies culminate with performance 
as the ultimate outcome, which implicitly assumes higher individual performance carries 
nearly universal benefits.  
For several reasons, we argue shedding new light on this assumption is warranted. 




While the contributions of higher performers bring advantage and utility to their 
employing organizations, supervisors, and work units (Bass, 1990), we rarely consider 
how high performance affects individual performers. Second, consideration of 
performance consequences for individuals remains largely limited to an economic view. 
High performers earn greater financial benefits and opportunities for advancement; 
however, evidence suggests the effect of performance on social resources and interactions 
is not straightforward. For example, research found high performance buffered 
employees from abusive supervision (Tepper, Moss, & Duffy, 2011), but also revealed 
high cognitive ability employees are more often targeted with aggressive behaviors (Kim 
& Glomb, 2010). Third, individual performance rarely occurs in isolation, yet most 
inquiries fail to meaningfully consider the broader social context in which individual 
performance is embedded. Increasingly, work occurs in groups, involving dynamic 
collaboration and requiring frequent interaction with others (Grant & Parker, 2009; 
Griffin, Neal, & Parker, 2007). Within such contexts, knowledge of individual 
performance quality transmits quickly among members (Molleman, Nauta, & Buunk, 
2007). Accordingly, we expect that performance relative to the group shapes how peers 
view and behave toward individual performers.  
The goal of our investigation is to advance and test a theoretical model of social 
consequences of high performance. To enrich understanding of this phenomenon, we 
invoke conservation of resources theory (Hobfoll, 1989; 2001). This perspective makes 
clear that employees are motivated to build and conserve their access to resources. We 
suggest and offer evidence that peers view high performing colleagues as both beneficial 




the extent to which they offer social support or undermine high performers. We further 
examine whether prosocial characteristics of the performers and the social context tip the 
balance toward less destructive, more favorable consequences. 
In developing our theoretical model, we seek to contribute to existing literature in 
several ways. First, we point toward the folly of focusing on the value outperformers 
often generate at the expense of ignoring the social consequences they can provoke. 
Higher performers are unlikely to simply yield positive consequences. However, social 
downside of performing well has been largely ignored—with several noteworthy 
exceptions. These include Dalton’s (1948) early work from the unionized factory floor 
where highly productive individuals were pressured to ease up, Kim and Glomb’s (2010) 
study of the higher rates of victimization for high cognitive ability workers in health care 
homes, and Lam and colleagues’ (2011) research on interpersonal harming that can result 
when peers expected disparity between an individual’s performance and their own. 
Collectively, these studies indicate that high performers may attract negative responses 
from peers. Still, we lack understanding of both the mechanisms driving these behaviors 
and whether higher performer might also draw more positive social behaviors from peers. 
Consequently, our study extends consideration to both peer prosocial behaviors (i.e., 
social support) and peer antisocial behaviors (i.e., social undermining) in an attempt to 
paint a balanced portrait of social responses to high performers. Related, there is little in 
the form of theoretical explanations as to why higher performers are socially supported or 
undermined. We identify relevant mechanisms and, by doing so, highlight an important 
paradox created by high performers: peers view them as both beneficial and threatening 




unearth antecedents and boundary conditions for the impact of destructive behaviors at 
work (e.g., Duffy, Scott, Shaw, Tepper, & Aquino, 2012; Duffy, Shaw, Scott, & Tepper, 
2006). We extend understanding of precipitators of antisocial behaviors, capture 
psychological mechanisms of the perpetrators, and consider the buffering potential of 
individual- and group-level boundary conditions. Third, we investigate how prosocial 
characteristics and environments may shield high performers against detrimental social 
responses. Through this investigation, we add to the growing body of research that has 
underscored the value of being other-oriented (Grant, 2013a; Rioux & Penner, 2001) and 
respond to the calls to examine how nature of the social context of work groups affects 
colleague behaviors (e.g., Duffy, Ganster, Shaw, Johnson, & Pagon, M. 2006; Glomb & 
Liao, 2003; Robinson & O’Leary-Kelly, 1998). Finally, we seek to complement and 
counterbalance studies that have begun to examine how peers respond to poor performers 
and why (e.g., LePine & Van Dyne, 2001; Jackson & LePine, 2003; Ferguson, Ormiston, 
& Moon, 2010).  
In the following sections, we apply conservation of resources theory as the 
conceptual basis for our model, to which we integrate literature on social appraisal and 
exchange. Figure 1 summarizes our model. We then present initial empirical findings 
from an experimental pilot study and then a large two-wave, multilevel, multisource field 
study. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
 
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF HIGH PERFORMANCE 




Hollenbeck, 1991; Welbourne, Johnson, & Erez, 1998), most agree that individual 
performance reflects the degree of proficiency and quality in employees’ accomplishment 
of tasks specific to their role and contextually-relevant contributions (Campbell, McCloy, 
Oppler, & Sager, 1993; Griffin et al., 2007). Increasingly, individuals perform within the 
context of a workgroup. Workgroups describe a collection of individual members who 
are viewed—both by others and the members themselves—as a social entity and perform 
work that affects one another (Guzzo & Dickson, 1996). Limiting characterization of the 
quality of individual performance to an absolute, rather than a relative, phenomenon thus 
seems insufficient—especially given proxies for status are most meaningful when 
considering the local hierarchy (cf. Ridgeway & Walker, 1995). Accounting for relative 
performance differences is integral to understanding how composition of differences 
across workgroup members significantly influences perceptions, social interactions, and 
behaviors (Harrison & Klein, 2007). Accordingly, we expect the way peers view and treat 
performers hinges not upon absolute criteria, but rather how their performance compares 
to the performance norm (i.e., average level of performance) across the group. As 
individual performers deviate from average collective performance norms, they are more 
likely to draw attention, trigger sensemaking, and evoke a behavioral response from peers 
(Weick, 1995). 
 
SECTION 2.2: THE PARADOX OF HIGH PERFORMERS: BEING A BENEFIT 
YET POSING A THREAT 
Employees actively assess their work environment to identify advantages and 




perspective broadly conceptualizes resources as individuals’ overall capability to fulfill 
their needs. We focus our scope to material and social resources—those observable to 
peers. When working to conserve resources, individuals recognizes—and 
disproportionately weighs—cues that are most relevant to the context (Maner, Miller, 
Moss, Leo, & Plant, 2012). For example, physical characteristics feature more 
prominently in contexts that require endurance or strength, whereas cognitive ability 
should carry more salience in the context of an intellectual task. Attributes that are highly 
relevant to the context become central to impression formation (Flynn, Chatman, & 
Spataro, 2001). As individual performance is critical within the work context, it serves as 
a salient cue by which peers evaluate and differentiate colleagues at work (Allport, 1954).  
We expect higher performing colleagues to prompt complex appraisal process for 
peers. On one hand, a high performing member often draws more resources to the group. 
On the other hand, a higher performing member often garners a disproportionate amount 
of resources within the group. A high performer can essentially increase the size of the 
group’s pool of resources and also earn a larger portion of the pool. This is consistent 
with work indicated that—rather than lying on a continuum from negative to positive—
many relationships both helpful and harmful (e.g., Uchino, Holt-Lenstad, Smith, & Bloor, 
2004). Drawing from a resource perspective, we expect that peers are more likely to 
evaluate higher performers as more beneficial and threatening to their own access to 
resources. This perspective maps to the two delineated mechanisms through which the 
conservation process unfolds (Hobfoll, 2002).  
First, conservation of resources theory contends that individuals actively scan to 




to see higher performers as beneficial to their resources access through this mechanism. 
Higher performers often elevate the workgroup reputation, attract more customers, offer 
greater expertise, and increase leader satisfaction with the group. The prestige they draw 
to the workgroup can also serves peers’ own self-interest and self-esteem (Hogg & 
Abrams, 1988). Higher individual performance carries assumption of greater relevant 
expertise, skills, and competencies (Berger, Fiske, Norman, & Zelditch, 1977), and 
increases likelihood of being viewed as a source of advice (Sparrowe, Liden, Wayne, & 
Kraimer, 2001). Possessing valued capabilities increases high performers’ potential 
helpfulness, and therefore their instrumental value to other workgroup members (Van der 
Vegt, Bunderson, & Oosterhof, 2006). They are also more valuable sources of learning 
and other developmental functions for peers (Kram, 1988).  
Consider a law firm associate who offers valuable expertise or contributes beyond 
expectations during preparation of a new brief preparation or a hair stylist who has been 
trained in advanced techniques. Working with such a colleague can prove beneficial to 
those around her. Because higher performing members often enhance workgroup 
reputation. Her presence increases availability of expertise and improved learning 
opportunities for those around her. Her group’s leader is also more likely to be satisfied 
with the group. 
Second, individuals are motivated to actively recognize and protect themselves 
against threats to their resources (i.e., protection mechanisms). Peers are likely to see 
higher performers as threatening to their resources access through this mechanism. As 
performance often serves as a chief determinant of resource allocation, higher performers 




threat to many social and material resources, which are typically finite or difficult to 
increase.  
Higher performers often earn higher status, receive better tasks or opportunities, 
and attract extra leader attention. Peers have plenty of reasons to be concerned since high 
performers earn for themselves greater status (Anderson, John, Keltner, & Kring, 2001) 
and are also likely to trigger unwelcome comparisons to their own performance 
(Lockwood, 2002). Supervisors may be more inclined to offer higher performers prime 
workspace, new technology, or better clients. Higher performers also commonly benefit 
from greater favor and closer relationships with their leaders (Wayne & Ferris, 1990; 
Bauer & Green, 1996). Peers worry high performers will increase leaders’ expectations 
(Dalton, 1948; Roethlisberger & Dickson, 1939).  
Imagine how associates within a law firm may view a high performing colleague 
who is attracting more attention from partners, or how hair stylists may evaluate a 
colleague who the salon manager frequently recognizes as a great example of effective 
customer service. For example, consultants known for their strong performance often 
earn themselves “first call” to be assigned to new projects that arise. Similarly, it is easy 
to see why managers often schedule new customer appointments with more talented hair 
stylists to capitalize on first impressions and to build the salon’s base of customers. By 
earning special preference or extra resources, high performers create costs for peers and 
deplete the overall resource pool for the workgroup (Rousseau, Ho, & Greenberg, 2006).  
Taken together, we expect peers will view higher performers as both beneficial 
and threatening to their social and material resource access.  




perceptions that the performer is a benefit to social and material resources. 
Hypothesis 2. An individual’s performance positively relates to peers’ (i.e., coworkers’) 
perceptions that the performer is a threat to social and material resources. 
 
SECTION 2.3 SOCIAL RESPONSES TO HIGH PERFORMERS 
Peers’ perceptions of a colleague shape their social behaviors toward him or her 
over the course of a working relationship. Consistent with a resource perspective, 
stronger judgments of an individual beget stronger social behavioral responses (Hobfoll, 
2001). Principles of self-interest dictate that, after cost-benefit comparison of 
opportunities to social effort required, people cultivate relationships with individuals they 
consider more beneficial or valuable to their own resources access (Blau, 1964). 
Employees seek to maximize the quality of relationships with those that bring them the 
most value (Gibbons, 2004). We expect that when peers perceive that a colleague 
augments or, conversely, puts at risk their own resource access, they are motivated to 
react—both cultivating connections with performers seen as potential benefactors and 
protecting against performers viewed as potentially detrimental to their resources 
(Hobfoll, 2001). The accumulation mechanism underpinning resources conservation 
theory suggests that peer perceptions of high performers as beneficial to their resources 
will motivate them to reciprocate. We expect them to intentionally reciprocate benefit to 
their higher performing colleague (i.e., prosocial behaviors; Brief & Motowidlo, 1986). 
In parallel, the protection mechanism of resource conservation theory suggests that peer 
perceptions of high performers as threatening to their resources will prompt them to 




antisocial behaviors; Robinson & O’Leary-Kelly, 1998). At a given moment, peers may 
elect prosocial or antisocial behavioral responses; however, these sets of behaviors are 
not polar opposites, but rather independent and distinct (Dalal, 2005). Over the course of 
time at work, we expect that higher performers attract both types of responses.  
First, when peers perceive individuals as valuable, they are motivated to prove 
themselves likewise and to engage in interactions to cultivate a social relationship (Blau, 
1964). While most commonly viewed through a lens of altruism, research suggests that 
prosocial behavior can also be motivated by self-interest and instrumental personal gain 
(Grant & Mayer, 2009; De Dreu, Nijstad, & van Knippenberg, 2008). When peers 
perceive that a colleague can benefit them, we expect that they are more motivated to 
enact prosocial behaviors as a way to prompt reciprocated beneficence. Second, peers are 
likely more motivated to enact prosocial behavior so as to reconcile any perceived 
obligation (Gouldner, 1960). Therefore, we expect peers will be motivated to maintain 
access to high performers and engage in more relationship-building, prosocial behaviors.  
In our investigation of peers’ prosocial behaviors to high performers, we focus on 
social support because it represents a key form of prosocial behavior and is integral to the 
quality of social relationships (Leavy, 1983). Social support refers to intentional 
behaviors extended for “fostering positive interpersonal relationships” (Duffy, Ganster, & 
Pagon, 2002: 333). Social support signals that the target is cared for, esteemed, valued, 
and “belongs to a network of communication and mutual obligation” (Cobb, 1976: 300). 
It is considered a near universally beneficial resource (Hobfoll & London, 1986). 
Empirical review of social support literature attests to its value in buffering employees 




Fisher, 1999), promoting individual well-being (Johnson & Hall, 1988), job performance 
(Beehr, Jex, Stacy, & Murray, 2000), satisfaction, commitment, and decreasing 
individual intentions to quit (Chiaburu & Harrison, 2008). A hotshot consultant or highly 
creative stylist earns for himself a reputation with peers of being a beneficial source of, 
for example, expertise or creative ideas, peers strengthen their connection and 
opportunities to exchange with him by expressing interest, extending their own help, or 
offering in return their own skills or ideas. We expect peers to extend more social support 
toward individuals viewed as advantageous to work resources in order to reinforce strong 
relationships to allow resources flow and relieve themselves from felt obligation. 
Hypothesis 3. Peer perceptions that a performer is beneficial to work resources positively 
relate to the support that the performer experiences from peers. 
 
 In tandem, when peers sense a colleague poses potential risk to work resources, 
we expect them to reciprocate with antisocial behaviors. Peers are naturally motivated to 
defend against perceived threats—even if it means engaging in dysfunctional behaviors 
or taking actions that are out of character (Hobfoll, 1989). Antisocial behaviors are both 
highly destructive and incredibly costly to organizations (Griffin, O’Leary-Kelly, & 
Collins, 1998). Being the focus of such behaviors harms individual performance, as well 
as physical and psychological well-being (Lim, Cortina, & Magley, 2008). Antisocial 
behaviors are natural responses used to retaliate against threat (O'Leary-Kelly, Duffy, & 
Griffin, 2000; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997) and may be viewed as a form of reciprocity 
toward performers for posing threat in the first place. In studying social exchanges, 




and the recipient feels obliged to respond in kind (Gergen, 1969). While less studied 
compared with virtuous social exchanges, tenets of social exchange also apply to 
responding negatively in kind toward individuals thought to deplete resources (Gouldner, 
1960). 
Antisocial reactions can effectively minimize a high performer’s social influence 
(i.e., strength of threat) by contributing to social exclusion and preventing them from 
further embedding within the social fabric of the group. Such behaviors often intend to 
marginalize accomplishments and to call into question the expertise from which 
performers derived influence. Empirical work from a variety of research streams supports 
these arguments. For example, Aquino & Douglas (2003) found employees who 
experienced threats to their sense of identity targeted the source of those threats with 
antisocial behavior. In their study of dyads, Lam and colleagues found that unfavorable 
performance comparisons increased interpersonal harming behaviors, arguing 
comparisons damage the perpetrators’ view of self (Lam, Van der Vegt, Walter, & 
Huang, 2011). Early management research also demonstrated that peers are more likely 
to lash out against a colleague who they view as threatening (Dalton, 1948; 
Roethlisberger & Dickson, 1939).  
We expect peers enact antisocial behaviors specifically designed to socially 
undermine higher performers. Social undermining describes intentional efforts to impede 
others’ ability to establish and sustain effective interpersonal relationships, to achieve 
work success, and to maintain a strong reputation (Duffy et al., 2002). In professional 
contexts, peers could not openly and directly lash out against a star lawyer, strong 




light. Social undermining as a manifestation of antisocial behavior offers an avenue to 
weaken the influence of the outperformers in ways that are more calculated and discreet 
(Duffy et al., 2006). Though more gradual, research offers broad evidence of the 
debilitating effects of social undermining on targets’ well-being, work attitudes, and work 
behaviors (Duffy et al., 2002; Duffy et al., 2012). Social undermining may be used to 
restore social balance (Tai, Narayanan, & McAllister, 2011), express frustration (Bies, 
Tripp, & Framer, 1997), reduce the target’s influence (LePine & Van Dyne, 2001), and 
thwart the target’s future success (Duffy et al., 2012). We propose that peers are 
motivated to socially undermine those perceived to threaten to their resource access as a 
form of defense fueled by self-protection, a form of reciprocity for perceived injurious 
effects of the target, and a mechanism to indirectly erode the social and expertise-based 
influence of target.  
Hypothesis 4. Peer perceptions that a performer is threat to work resources positively 
relate to the undermining that the performer experiences from peers. 
 
SECTION 2.4: MODERATING FACTORS 
Moderating Characteristics: Performing with Benevolent Intentions 
 
Next, we considered whether certain individual characteristics enhance the extent 
higher performers are considered beneficial and buffer them from being considered 
threatening. Owing to principles of social appraisal and attribution, coworkers endeavor 
to generate explanations for stimuli that deviate from norms and expectations 
(Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1981; Wong & Weiner, 1981). When forming attributions 




(Eastman, 1994; Allen & Rush, 1998). While this view assumes that peers are discerning 
of individual motives, evidence has shown peers to be fairly accurate in judging the 
motives of others (e.g., Grant, Parker, & Collins, 2009; Maierhofer, Griffin, & Sheehan, 
2000). The social context of work groups affords peers opportunities to observe one 
another’s verbal statements and behavioral patterns to assess motives (Grant et al., 2009).  
We expect that when high performers are also higher on prosocial motives (i.e., 
guided by the pursuit of benefiting, protecting, and promoting the welfare of others; 
Grant, 2008; Rioux & Penner, 2001; Schwartz & Bardi, 2001), peers view performers as 
more beneficial and less threatening. When peers size up higher performers who operate 
with more other-oriented intentions, they are more likely to assume that performers’ 
efforts are motivated for the group’s gain, rather than self-interest. In contrast, we expect 
that a less other-oriented performers grant peers greater opportunity to evaluate 
performance efforts as self-serving. Indirect evidence accords with this perspective. For 
example, employee contributions that extend beyond formal responsibilities were 
appraised more favorably when contributors were seen as other-oriented rather than self-
seeking (Eastman, 1994). Further, proactive contributions of employees were more 
favorably related to supervisor appraisal when employees were higher in prosocial 
motives (Grant et al., 2009). Kim and Glomb (2010) also offered evidence that 
individuals with higher preferences for communion reduced their risk of victimization.  
Hypothesis 5. Performer prosocial motives strengthen the positive relationship between 
his/her performance and being perceived beneficial to work resources. 
Hypothesis 6. Performer prosocial motives weaken the positive relationship between 




Cooperative Workgroup Climate Moderating Behavioral Response   
 As employee behavior is a function of both individual perceptions and the 
environment (Lewin, 1951; Hackman, 1992), we now turn toward consideration of 
contexts that facilitate or dampen proposed paths to social support and social 
undermining. We focus on workgroup climate, because it offers a descriptive view of the 
environment and reflects group members’ shared perceptions of their immediate context 
in terms of practices, policies, procedures, routines, and rewards (Ostroff, Kinicki, & 
Muhammad, 2013; Schneider, Ehrhart, & Macey, 2011). Climate scholars emphasize it 
should be characterized with regard to specific criteria (Ostroff et al., 2013). Accordingly, 
as our focus anchors on prosocial or antisocial behaviors directed toward high 
performers, we investigate a type of climate that signals shared expectations about how 
members should socially interact: cooperative climate.  
Cooperative climate reflects the extent to which members share perceptions that 
collective objectives and mutual interests should be pursued (Chatman & Flynn, 2001). 
Cooperative climates place greater relative importance on common interests, value 
interpersonal harmony, and promote higher employee satisfaction and team effectiveness 
(Chatman & Flynn, 2001). Such norms govern social exchange processes and serve as 
guideposts that constrain certain behaviors and facilitate others (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 
2005). We expect higher cooperative climates to reinforce peers’ motivation to support 
individuals who can benefit them and amplify the expression of such motivation in the 
form of social support. Cooperative climates place greater value on the cultivation of 
supportive relationships and maintenance of harmony, which we expect to fuel peers’ 




this perspective, showing cooperative norms strengthened the relationship between 
individual motivation and enactment of prosocial behaviors (e.g., knowledge sharing; 
Quigley, Tesluk, Locke, & Bartol, 2007). Therefore, we propose: 
Hypothesis 7. Workgroup cooperative climate strengthens the positive relationship 
between peers’ perception that a performer is beneficial to resources and the support 
offered to him or her.  
 
In addition, we propose that higher cooperative climates constrain the effect that 
peer perceptions of threat from manifesting as social undermining toward performers. 
Higher cooperative climates foster social resources among members (e.g., quality and 
quantity of relationships at work; Dutton & Heaphy, 2003) as well as other resources, 
such as shared knowledge and trust. When individuals see resources as more plentiful, 
they protect them less vigilantly (Hobfoll, 1989). Second, harming others at work 
inherently violates cooperative norms. Lashing out at high performers in cooperative 
climates likely poses greater risk to peers’ social standing or credibility within the group. 
Cooperative workgroup climates prescribe beneficence toward others and thus encourage 
greater self-sanction of antisocial behavior.  
Hypothesis 8. Workgroup cooperative climate attenuates the positive relationship 
between peers’ perception that a performer is threatening to resources and the social 
undermining enacted toward him or her. 
SECTION 2.5: PILOT: SCENARIO STUDY  
Overview of Research 




studies (referred to as Study A and Study B in this dissertation). Our explanations for 
why higher performers spark differential social consequences of hinge upon how peers 
perceive performers affect their access to social and material resources. We considered it 
important to initially examine these proposed psychological mechanisms in a controlled 
setting to isolate perceptions from bias (cf. Kerlinger & Lee, 2000). The objectives of the 
Pilot study, a scenario-based study, were focused and three-fold: (a) to affirm causal 
order of Hypotheses 1 and 2—that performance shapes perceptions of how individuals 
impact to resources rather than vice-versa, (b) to isolate the effects of performance on 
peers’ perceptions from the influence of any relevant but omitted third variable (e.g., 
other characteristics of the performer that can affect both performance and peers’ 
perceptions of resource benefit/threat), and (c) to offer initial evidence that peers’ view 
higher performers as both more beneficial and more threatening to social and material 
work resources (i.e., perceptions are orthogonal). Next, we tested our full theoretical 
model in Study A—a multi-source, multi-level, time-lagged field study in a large chain of 
salons. This setting facilitated testing of moderating characteristics of the individual 
performers and the social context, which require time to socially transmit and influence 
peer opinions and behaviors (cf. Kozlowski & Klein, 2000). Then, we assessed our model 
in controlled setting, which enabled us to gather convergent results from another task and 
country context, and to establish causal order. 
Sample, Design, and Procedures  
The initial Pilot study was comprised of 85 respondents who were recruited 
through an online community of research participants. This network is similar in structure 




however, it restricts membership to individuals who are students or alumni at accredited 
U.S. universities. We sent a message to members, inviting them to participate in a study 
on workplace dynamics in exchange for a small monetary incentive ($1.50). We 
described the study as a case study of coworker dynamics. We instructed participants to 
read a scenario (see Appendix A) that requested them to assume the role of an account 
manager within a consulting firm. The scenario described their workgroup and their 
individual responsibilities: overseeing of high-level project coordination, development 
and maintenance client relationships, and attracting new clients. We experimentally 
varied colleague performance within-subjects by profiling two colleagues (i.e., 
performers): one high performer and one low performer. The performance of each 
colleague was described qualitatively—with one being markedly high performing while 
the other performing less successfully. We presented quantitative results from colleagues’ 
annual performance appraisal, which displayed one colleague as visibly above average 
and the other as clearly below average on objective metrics. Then, we administered a 
questionnaire to assess perceived benefit and perceived threat to material and social work 
resources and to check effectiveness of manipulation. To increase confidence in data 
integrity, we eliminated participants who failed to accurately answer an attention filter 
question1 and whose survey time fell outside of two standard deviations above or below 
the mean time. The retained sample included 71 participants (84 percent). Participants 
were 75 percent male, averaged 10.6 years of work experience and 31.6 years of age. 
Measures 
Manipulation check. To assess the within-person performance manipulation, we 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Embedded within a short paragraph, we asked respondents to answer “none of the above” to a subsequent 




asked the participants to judge the quality of each colleague’s performance based on the 
information describe in the scenario (1 = above average, 2 = average, 3 = below average).  
Psychological Mechanisms: Peer Perceptions. We asked participants to report 
the extent they believed each performer would benefit and threaten their access to 
material and social resources at work. We relied upon items adapted from Spreitzer 
(1996) scale measuring access to resources. The three-item scale for perceived benefit 
included, “improve your access to resources, such as client contacts and ideas,” “elevate 
the reputation of the group,” and “benefit your access to important work resources.” (α 
= .74). The four-item scale for perceived threat included, “be a source of competition in 
terms of access to clients”, “be a source of competition to supervisor’s time and 
attention,” “use more than her fair share of resources such as supplies and workspace,” 
and “threaten your access to important work resources” (α = .80). Items relied upon a 
Likert-type scale anchoring from 1, “disagree strongly,” to 5, “agree strongly”.  
PILOT STUDY: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Table 1 displays the summary and descriptive statistics by condition.  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Manipulation Check. Participants rated performance of the high performer more 
favorably than the low performer (M = 1.07 and 2.68, respectively). Paired samples t-
tests indicated that respondents viewed performance levels as we intended (t(70) = -
18.135; p < .001). 
Effects of Peer Perceptions. Participants rated the higher performer as 
significantly more beneficial and significantly more threatening to social and material 




p < .001, respectively).  
This pilot study achieved two important gains. First, the controlled nature of the 
experiment enabled establishment of causality and isolated the relationships between 
performance and peer perceptions from the influence any potential omitted variables. 
Second, findings demonstrated that peers can view performers as both beneficial and 
threatening to their access to resources, which may seem initially counterintuitive. 
Results offered initial support for Hypotheses 1 and 2—that peers’ perceptions of how a 
colleague impacts their work resources are shaped by his or her performance level, 
highlighting that high performers can trigger seemingly opposite effects on peer 
perceptions. Next, we turn to the field to replicate these findings and conduct a full test of 
our model in Study A.  
SECTION 2.6: STUDY A: FIELD STUDY 
Sample, Design, and Procedures 
Building from this initial pilot evidence, we conducted a time-lagged field study, 
collecting multilevel, multisource data from 414 hairstylists working for 120 salons in a 
large Taiwanese chain. This context was particularly apt for our investigation for several 
reasons. First, this context is highly interactive. Stylists work in the same open space. 
This makes social exchanges between coworkers both frequent and visible and makes 
individual performance indicators, such as customer satisfaction and output of service 
treatment, more tangibly apparent to coworkers. Second, the relative uniformity in the 
number of stylists per salon (retained data mean = 3.75, s.d. = .92; range = 3-6) lends 
confidence in the comparability of within-salon social dynamics among coworkers. 




collective tasks among coworkers in order to effectively serve customers. On the one 
hand, the stylists take care of their customers mostly by themselves during the service 
encounters, and on the other hand, they frequently work with one another on social, 
technical, and administrative activities (e.g., client consultations, learning new 
techniques, etc.). Fourth, examination of this phenomenon carried practical management 
value for leaders from our partnering organization who were actively seeking to 
understand potential influencers of employee retention within this industry, which is 
plagued with high employee turnover (Zeller, McLaughin, & Frick, 1992). In addition, 
the strength of each salon’s reputation—a product of collective performance—directly 
impacts each stylist’s customer base and financial compensation. In contrast with the 
common U.S. salon business model, stylists within work groups are more interdependent 
(e.g., they have co-training events and help backup one another). Further, tipping is 
uncommon in this setting. Instead, stylists are compensated based on both their individual 
monthly sales and their salon’s overall sales. This hybrid incentive system creates an 
environment where peers may consider high performers as both beneficial (e.g., 
contribution to store sales) and threatening (e.g., competition for customers) to resources. 
Overall, the salons offered numerous advantages to test our proposed theoretical model.  
After securing organizational approval, trained research assistants visited the 120 
salons to invite managers and employees to confidentially and anonymously participate 
in a research study. At Time 1, research assistants visited each site and distributed two 
types of paper and pencil surveys: one to managers to capture employee performance and 
the other to employees to assess demographics (i.e., age, gender, and tenure), self-




assistants returned eight weeks later to administer Time 2 measures, which assessed peer 
perceptions of one another and the extent to which performers experienced social support 
and social undermining. Token gifts to express our gratitude were given to everyone who 
volunteered to participate. 
Out of the 120 salons, all managers participated, 395 employees participated at 
Time 1 (95%), and 352 participated at Time 2 (85%). Our phenomenon focuses on social 
dynamics within workgroups. Therefore, we excluded salons that failed to meet two 
criteria important to match the research context with our theory. First, we restricted our 
sample to salons having at least 3 full-time stylists (in addition to the full-time managers) 
since 3 members reflects the minimum size to theoretically be considered a workgroup 
(Simmel, 1950; Levine & Moreland, 1990; Menon & Phillips, 2011). Second, we relied 
upon social network methods of assessment in which each stylist rates all stylists on 
items capturing our mediating and dependent variables. To reliability capture ratings of 
peers’ perceptions of individual performers (rather than those idiosyncratic to a particular 
peer), we required multiple peer raters (cf. Wasserman & Faust, 1994). For example, in a 
salon of four stylist, all three peers had to rate each focal performer on mechanisms. In 
parallel, each focal performer rated social support and social undermining experienced 
from each of the three peers to meaningfully capture how he or she was treated across 
peers. Our final retained sample included 300 employees nested within 80 salons. Stylists 
were predominately female (93 percent), averaged 28 years old, and 85 percent held at 
least a bachelor’s degree or equivalent.  
Measures  




independent bilingual translators to ensure they retained conceptual meaning (Brislin, 
1980). Items relied upon Likert-style scales anchored at 1 (“not at all”) and 5 (“to a very 
great extent), unless otherwise specified.  
Performance. Managers rated employee performance using a 5-item scale 
anchored from 1 (needs much improvement) to 5 (excellent). The scale was comprised of 
Welbourne and colleagues’ (1998) 4-item measure for job role performance (e.g., 
“quality of work” and “quantity of work”) and added one item to capture context-relevant 
performance, “creativity of work” (α = .93).  
We elected to use manager-rated performance for several reasons. First, this 
design reduced common method bias, which could have inflated the effects between 
peer-rated individual performance and peer-rated perceptions (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & 
Lee, Podsakoff, 2003). Second, it offered more objective, fair assessment since peer 
evaluations of colleague performance may be influenced by personal relationships, self-
serving biases, or their own performance expectations. We assumed that peers had a 
sense for one another’s performance and supervisor evaluations. To ensure data 
converged with our assumptions, we also directly assessed individual performance from 
peers. Results showed peer and manager ratings were significantly correlated (r = .56), 
indicating peers understood who was consider higher performing within their salon. 
Lastly, we ran analyses using both peer- and manager-rated performance and obtained the 
same pattern of results across sources. 
Prosocial motives. We assessed employee prosocial motives via a 4-item measure 
by Grant (2008; e.g. “to have a positive impact on others through my work”), asking 




service to their customers (α = .91). The context makes salient two types of beneficiaries 
of each stylist’s work: customers and peers. Being helpful and other-oriented, during 
customer service exchanges carries instrumental value for employees (Liao & Searcy, 
2012), so even individuals who are low in prosocial motives may still act other-oriented 
toward customers (Rioux & Penner, 2001). Further, customer-service professionals are 
trained and expected to maintain a prosocial demeanor during customer transactions, 
which positively biases their use of prosocial behaviors toward the customer (i.e., results 
in less controllability; Weiner, 1981). Given this, it was important to isolate individual 
prosocial motives specifically toward coworkers. 
Perceived threat and benefit to work resources. We measured perceived benefit 
and threat to resources using measures previously piloted. Guided by the application of 
Spritzer’s (1996) access to resource scale into a network assessment format (e.g., Seibert, 
Kraimer, & Linden, 2001), we asked employees to rate the extent to which they agreed to 
items regarding each colleague. Two items measured perceived benefit (e.g., “is a 
beneficial source of resources to me, like customer contacts, ideas and supplies” (α = .79) 
and three items measured perceived threat (e.g., “uses more of his/her fair share of the 
groups resources, like supplies, space and time with the boss”; α = .72). We then created 
two composite ratings by averaging across the peers’ ratings of each focal employee in 
the group to reflect the extent to which each focal employee is viewed by coworkers as a 
benefit and threat to social and material resources. We examined aggregation statistics for 
each of these proposed mediating variables to ensure this treatment was justifiable. For 
perceived benefit, median rwg = .83, ICC(1) = .19, and ICC(2) = .41, F(299, 585) = 1.69, p 




1.93, p < .001. These statistics offered support that meaningful variance in peer ratings of 
threat and benefit is attributable to each individual performer.  
Social support and social undermining. We also used a network measure to 
assess social support, using five items from the scale created by Barrera, Sandler, and 
Ramsay (1981; e.g., “let you know he/she will be around if you need assistance”; α 
= .92). Each colleague rated the extent to which each coworker intentionally behaved in 
the way specified by each item. Because of the network approach, reliance on the full 11-
item scale would have been too taxing on the respondents. Retained items were those 
with both stronger factor loadings and highest contextual relevance. We captured social 
undermining behavior via the same network approach using the 7-item scale from Duffy 
and colleagues (2006). Employees rated the extent to which each peer undermined them 
(α = .93; e.g., “belittled you or your ideas” and “excluded you from social functions 
within the group”). We created a composite variable for social support and a composite 
variable for social undermining by averaging performer’s ratings of the support and 
undermining received from each peer. The composites reflect the degree of social support 
or social undermining experienced by the focal individual from peers in the group.  
Workgroup cooperative climate. We relied upon the cooperative psychological 
climate scale used by Chatman and Flynn (2001), and aggregated individual responses 
(Time 1) to the workgroup level (α = .81; “there is a high level of cooperation between 
stylists”). Inter-rater agreement (i.e., rwg(j); cf. James, Demaree, & Wolf, 1984) 
averaged .93 across the 80 salons, signaling high within-group agreement (LeBreton & 
Senter, 2008). ICC(1) was .25, indicating 25 percent of the total variance in cooperative 




was .55, F(79, 220) = 2.24, p < .001, which supports our expectation that strength of 
cooperative climate varied meaningfully between salons (Bliese, 2000). Taken together, 
these statistics offered support for aggregation. 
Control variables. To rule out alternative explanations, we conducted all analyses 
with and without controlling for age, education, tenure, and gender, which can signal 
status, expertise, or competence (Berger et al., 1977; Bunderson, 2003) and influence 
likelihood of being the target of aggressive and antisocial behavior (Bowling & Beehr, 
2006; Duffy et al., 2012; Duffy et al., 2006; Tepper, 2000). Lastly, we ran all analyses 
with and without controlling for peers’ interpersonal liking of the focal performer given 
its potential to influence formation of social perceptions (Chua, Ingram, & Morris, 2008), 
quality of relationships, and social support (South, Bonjean, Markham, & Corder, 1982). 
We operationalized liking using a network approach, assessing strength of peer-rated 
friendship tie (i.e., “is someone you consider to be a friend, or might choose to see 
socially outside of work”; Ibarra, 1995). We averaged across the peers’ rating of each 
focal performer, which aggregation statistics indicate was reasonable (median rwg = .75; 
ICC(1) = .34; cf. LeBreton & Senter, 2008). The reliability of the means (ICC(2)) for 
liking of focal performer was .15, which is low but understandable, statistically, given the 
use of a one-item network measure and the idiosyncrasies that influence interpersonal 
liking (e.g., Ibarra, 1995). We found no differences with or without these control 
variables in the models. We report results without individual characteristics and 
interpersonal liking in the spirit of parsimony. 
Levels of Analysis and Analytical Strategy. We specify cooperative climate at the 




2013). Remaining variables reside at the individual level. Individual performance takes 
into account collective average. The performer is the focus of both peer perceptions of 
threat and benefit, as well as the target of social behaviors in responses to these 
perceptions, and therefore it is most appropriately viewed as an individual level of 
analysis of a phenomenon nested within a higher-level (workgroup) context (cf. 
Kozlowski & Klein, 2000). The nesting of individual-level data likely violated the 
independence assumption underpinning ordinary least squares regression (OLS). 
Consequently, we tested our hypotheses using random coefficient modeling in HLM 
(Raudenbush, Bryk, & Congdon, 2004), which enables estimation of both workgroup-
level (level 2) and individual-level (level 1) effects on social responses experienced by 
each performer (Hofmann, Griffin, & Gavin, 2000). Matching our theory, we group-mean 
centered manager-rated performance to operationalize individual performance relative to 
the group (cf. Hofmann, & Gavin, 1998). When examining the model with control 
variables, we also group-mean centered status proxies (i.e. age, education, and tenure) 
since they are typically most salient when compared to local surroundings (Bendersky & 
Hays, 2012).  
STUDY A: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Descriptive statistics appear in Table 2. Bivariate relationships among the 
variables largely accord with our theoretical expectations but should be cautiously 
interpreted given they fail to account for the nested nature of the data. When analyzing 
each dependent variable, we first entered individual relative performance (our distal 
predictor), adding proposed mediators of outcomes in subsequent models. We assessed 




described by MacKinnon, Lockwood, and Williams (2004) and the interactive tool 
created by Selig and Preacher (2008) to create a confidence interval using R. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
Test of Direct and Indirect Effects 
Table 3 summarizes the analyses. We first assessed whether individual relative 
performance was significantly related to peers’ perceptions. Performance positively 
predicted coworkers’ perceptions of both benefit (γ = .21, p < .001; Model 1) and threat 
(γ = .09, p < .01; Model 2a) to social and material resources, supporting Hypotheses 1 
and 2, respectively. Hypothesis 3 proposed that being perceived by peer as beneficial 
positively predicts the social support performers received; however, analysis suggested 
the opposite effect—with performers considered more beneficial experiencing 
significantly less social support (γ = -.27, p < .05; Model 3a). In support of Hypothesis 4, 
peer perceptions of the threat positively related to performers’ reported experience of 
social undermining from peers (γ = .39, p < .001; Model 4a). We examined the indirect 
effect using the Monte Carlo method outlined by Bauer, Preacher, and Gil (2006). Tests 
indicated a significant and negative indirect effect for higher performance on peer 
enacted social support (-.06; CI95% = [-.10, -.02]) and a significant positive indirect effect 
for higher performance on peer enacted social undermining (.04; CI95% = [.01, .07]).  
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3, 4, and 5 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
Test of Moderating Effects of Performer Prosocial Motives  
 
Next, we examined Hypotheses 5 and 6—whether performers’ prosocial motives 




them from being viewed by peers as threatening. Results indicated that performers’ 
prosocial motives did not strengthen the positive relationship between performance and 
peer perceptions of benefit (γ = -.04, n.s.; Model 1b) but did attenuate the relationship 
between performance and peer perceptions of threat (γ = -.16, p < .05; Model 2b). 
Following the procedures of Aiken and West (1991), we examined the simple slopes. 
Supporting Hypothesis 6, results indicated that higher performance positively predicted 
peer perceptions of threat when focal performers were low (γ = .20, p < .001), but not 
high (γ = .03, n.s.), in prosocial motives. Guided by steps outlined by Bauer and 
colleagues (2006), we multiplied the first and second stage effects and assessed the 
significance of these indirect effects at high and low levels of performer prosocial 
motives. We elected this method over Edwards and Lambert’s (2007) bootstrapping 
approach for moderated mediation since the resampling approach of the latter ignored the 
nested structure of these data. Analyses revealed a significant, positive indirect effect for 
relative performance on social undermining when prosocial motives were low (γ = .11, p 
< .01) but no effect when prosocial motives were high (γ = .00, n.s.), suggesting prosocial 
motives buffered higher performers from injurious social responses. Figure 2 illustrates 
this interaction and Table 4 summarizes the indirect effect of relative performance across 
varying levels of the performer’s prosocial motives. Analyses further revealed that high 
prosocial motives not only buffered high performers from being perceived as threatening 
to social and material resources (stage 1 moderation), but reduced the manifestation of 
threat perceptions as social undermining toward them (stage 2 moderation), which 
together underscored the value of being more other-oriented carries for high performers. 





Hypothesis 7 suggested that higher cooperative climates strengthened the 
relationship between being perceived as a benefit and the social support received. 
Findings demonstrated an interestingly moderating effect; though, given the negative, 
rather than expected positive, relationship between perceived benefit to resources by 
coworkers and social support received from coworkers, this relationship is not 
straightforward. To further understand this cross-level interaction effect, we plotted the 
simple slopes (see Figure 2). The pattern of relationships suggested that when peers 
perceived that others benefited their resource access, they were less likely to offer social 
support when cooperative climates were high (γ = -.68; p < .001), but not low (γ = -.23, 
n.s.). Higher performance had a significant, negative indirect effect on social support 
when cooperative climate was high (-.16; CI95% = -.29, -.07) but only a trending effect 
when cooperative climate was low (-.04; CI95% = -.12, .01). Results suggest that the social 
support expected in more cooperative climates did not extend to a high performer, a 
finding that we will discuss further in the Discussion. Hypothesis 8 proposed that more 
cooperative climates would constrain social undermining in response to threat; however, 
the relationship between perceived threat to resources and social undermining was still 
strong and positive when cooperative climate was high (γ = .35, p < .01) and low (γ 
= .40; p < .001) and did not significantly differ across levels of the moderator (difference 
-.05; CI95% = -.39, .20).  
In the field, we found that, like our initial pilot test, higher performance predicted 
stronger perceptions that the performer is both beneficial and threatening to peers’ work 
resources (H1 and H2). Results also illustrated an unfortunate view of the social 




negative consequences in the form of withheld support and increased undermining. Next, 
we seek to replicate these findings in a controlled context, address limitations, and further 
probe into the interesting effect that more cooperative climates have on the treatment of 
higher performers.  
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
 




Purpose & Contribution  
In order to address limitations to Study A, we conducted an experiment, which 
expanded our contribution by establishing causal order as well as to constructively 
replicating Study A results.  The context of a controlled experiment also provides us the 
opportunity to examine the proposed cognitive mechanisms in tandem with the emotional 
mechanism of felt envy that Kim and Glomb studies have linked to victimization of 
talented coworkers (2010; 2014). With Study B, we also sought to further unpack the 
surprisingly effect of a cooperative climate found in Study A by manipulating the 
incentive structure and description of the team context to influence variance in 
cooperative climate directly. Lastly, we broadened the domain of peer social responses 
toward high performers.  
Sample 
Three hundred and sixty-one undergraduate business majors enrolled in a large, 
public university on the east coast of United States participated in the study as partial 




to study virtual team performance and collaboration, and that they would be working 
together in teams. In total, there were 102 teams of 3 or 4 members each (mean = 3.54).  
We instructed participants that they would be working together to complete 
rounds of critical thinking and analytical reasoning tasks.  The rounds of tasks were a 
compilation of questions from past LSAT, GMAT, and Mensa tests.  We intentionally 
chose more difficult questions so that members would be uncertain of their own 
performance within each task. Students were incentivized to care about their teams’ 
performance because the top performing teams earned cash at the end of the semester—
$150 for teams of 3 and $200 for teams of four2. We chose to design the experiment in a 
virtual team context in order to retain both experimental control (i.e., performance 
feedback manipulation) and sense of interpersonal interactions in a work context.  
Design & Experimental Manipulations 
We designed a 2 (peer performance: average versus high) x 2 (cooperative 
climate: high versus low) between-subjects experiment in the context of newly formed 
teams.   
Manipulation 1: Peer Performance. We varied performance with member and 
team task scores provided to the team after each round of questions. In all teams, one 
student was randomly treated as the focal performer. In the control condition, his or her 
preset performance scores each round were comparable to peers. In the experimental, 
high performer condition, his or her scores each round were notably higher.  The other 
team members (i.e., peers who were subjects of the manipulation) received the same 
preset, similar performance scores (see Appendix B).   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 While additive team performance results varied across each condition—based upon whether participants 
were led to believe a high performer was present—teams were rewarded at the end of the semester based 




Manipulation 2: Cooperative Climate. A number of studies informed our 
thinking and guided our approach of inducing high versus low cooperative climate (e.g., 
Chatman & Barsade, 1995; Chatman et al., 1998; Hill, Bartol, Tesluk, & Langa, 2009; 
Tjosvold, 1985; Tjosvold et al., 2005; van Knippenberg et al., 2001). These studies 
advocated for a multi-pronged approach in which cooperative values are (1) explicitly 
espoused by an authority figure and (2) a contrasting reward structures is implemented 
that reinforced these espoused values.  Consistent with past work, we first provided an 
overview of the task that emphasized how teams may best work together. One version 
highlighted high cooperative interactions and one version that highlighted low 
cooperative interactions. Sample text from these manipulations display below: 
“Virtual teams make communication more difficult, so be sure to devote some 
time to collaborative discussion/spirited debate”… “Collective 
collaboration/Healthy competition within the team is fine—just make sure you 
complete your responsibilities.” 
 
Second, we varied the nature of incentives offered across conditions.  In the 
competitive condition, members of top performing teams were rewarded based on 
individual performance relative to the group, with a minimum of $15 per person and a 
maximum of $110 per participant. In the cooperative condition, members of top 
performing teams evenly split the cash prize, $50 per person.  The evenly split rewards 
functioned to focus members toward cooperative, team oriented interaction, while the 
differentiated, individual-based reward structure is likely to motivate individuals to 
appraise and maximize their own outcomes.  
Procedures  
For the first 15 minutes of the study, team members met and worked together at a 




an overview of the task and team incentives, and then gave them practice questions to 
review and discuss so as to better prepare them for the types of questions they would 
encounter when collaborating virtually. Next, we directed participants to individual 
workstations (i.e., cubicles with individual computers) and told them that they would be 
logging in and re-joining their teammates virtually.  
To simulate a virtual environment, a Qualtrics survey was coded. Students were 
instructed on how to “log in” to the site to be “connected to their team members.” Once 
participants “were connected” to their teammates, they were guided through their task 
rounds by a “research administrator” from whom they received messages and instructions 
(i.e., preset text coded to appear like an instant message). At various points in time, the 
“administrator” in the virtual environment asked the group questions or polled for 
opinions. Members could see their own responses and those feign to be the messages and 
responses from their teammates. These interactions were fabricated for the purposes of 
experiment to help legitimize the rouse that members were virtually connected.  
Once in the virtual team environment, team members were each presented with a 
different, unique task strategy, and told that sharing was likely to help their team’ 
performance. Strategies included tips and approaches such as how to identify hidden 
assumptions and how to efficiently eliminate incorrect answers to guess well on hard 
questions. For the remainder of the study, team members performed four task rounds (3 
rounds and 1 bonus round) in their simulated virtual team. At three points in time, team 
members were permitted to chat for a limited duration via a Google Chat with their real 
team members: after learning their unique task strategies and after Round 1 and Round 2 





Mechanisms: Perception of Resources. After Round 2 feedback, I used the same 
measures as Study A to assess participants appraisal of how each member of their team 
affected their social and material resources adapted to the task context. Items capturing 
perceptions of benefit of threat to resources were tied to a 6-point Likert scale ranging 
from 1 (not at all) to 5 (to a very great extent).  
Dependent Variables: Social Responses to the Focal Performer 
Social Support.  We operationalized supportive behaviors in two ways.  First, we 
captured the odds of participants to share information with a peer. After Round 2, we 
gave the participant another hint to assist them with the next rounds (i.e., “none of the 
answers to the questions in Round 3 are (E) none of the above”). We told them that they 
could share with one other member of their team, asking them whom they would like to 
share with: either the focal performer (coded as 1) or another peer (coded as 0). Second, 
we also assessed whether they would offer an opportunity to a peer based on 
performance. After Round 3, participants were told that they qualified for a bonus round 
and could choose one other qualifying member to join them for this opportunity. They 
were offered the option of choosing between the focal performer (coded as 1) and one of 
their other peers (coded as 0). The message noted that points earned during this round 
would still count toward their individual scored.  
Response to Social Undermining. The base rate for social undermining within a 
small window of time is low (Kammeyer-Mueller, Wanberg, Rubenstein, & Song, 2013) 
and would be difficult to observe naturally in a constructed setting. Therefore, we created 




between participants. In brief, each non-focal performer (i.e., peers) was told they were 
paired with one of their other teammates to complete a bonus round (i.e., 4th round). At 
the beginning of the round, we told each participant that s/he had a couple of minutes to 
chat virtually with their partner before the round began. At that time, we sent participants 
a pre-scripted message that appeared to be from the team member that they were 
partnered with.  The initial chat lines first mention the difficulty of the task and offered 
the participant the chance to respond.  Then, the second scripted message from the team 
member mentioned that s/he thought the “[focal performer’s name] was kind of 
annoying.” We captured how participants responded to this social undermining of the 
focal performer to assess whether variances in responses were systematically influenced 
by condition and perception of benefit and threat. Upon completion of the study, two 
raters, blind to condition, coded the participants’ responses to this undermining of the 
focal performer. Using a seven-point scale, responses ranged from actively defending 
(e.g., “stop it, that’s not nice!”, coded as -3) the performer, to actively undermining the 
performer (e.g., “hahaha, I feel the same way, he sucks”, coded as 3). Neutral responses 
(e.g., “what is that?) were coded 0. We averaged these ratings across coder given that 
they independently achieve very high levels of agreement, rwg = .90, and reliability, 
ICC(2) = .93.  
Moderator: Cooperative Climate. We assessed participants’ perceptions of 
cooperative climate at the end of the study, relying on a 7-point scale and using the same 
measure as Study A (cf. Fletcher & Nusbaum, 2010; Chatman & Flynn, 2001).  
Additional Measures. Students were nearing the end of their coursework in the 




familiarity with other team members as a potentially relevant control variable: “How well 
did you know this person prior to today's study?” (1 = not at all; 5 = to a very great 
extent). 
We also measured peers felt envy, since it shares conceptual space with perceived 
threat.  The major distinct between the is the envy considered an emotional reaction and 
assumes a social comparison process that is personal and that the other person has 
something valuable or is already successful (for review, Duffy, Shaw, & Schaubroeck, 
2008) while perceived threat is a more instrumental, cognitive appraisal and implies no 
judgment of inferiority of self.  We surveyed participants after Round 2 on envy using a 
4-item measure adapted from Kim and Glomb’s (2014) 1-item network measure (“I envy 
this person’s task performance. For example, (1) it is so frustrating to see this person 
succeed so easily; (2) feelings of envy toward this person constantly torment me; (3) I 
generally feel inferior to this person’s success; or (4) this person’s success makes me 
resent this person.”). Items were adapted from the scale established by Schaubroeck and 
Lam (2004). We captured them as four separate items, which were “I envy this person’s 
task performance,” “I feel inferior to this person’s performance,” “this person's success in 
the task makes me resent him/her,” and “feelings of envy toward this person tormented 
me.” (α = .76). 
Manipulation Validation. To check whether participants were attentive to 
differences in performance scores across conditions, we asked participants the extent to 
which they agreed that each team member “…performed better than most team members” 






Manipulation Checks.   
 
Consistent with our manipulation, at the end of the study participants recalled the 
focal performing significantly better than others in the experimental condition than the 
control condition (M = 5.13 v. M = 3.80; p < .01).  Similarly, participants reported higher 
perceptions of cooperative climate in the condition that endorsed cooperative values and 
offered equal payout to team members, compared with the condition that endorsed more 
individual values and offered differential payout to team members (M = 5.07 v. M = 4.74; 
p < .05).  
Hypothesis Testing.   
Table 6 provides reliabilities and descriptive statistics, including means, standard 
deviations, and correlations. To assess hypotheses, we used ordinary least squared 
regression for continuous dependent variables and logistics regression for binary 
variables to account for their non-normal distribution. Following prescribed procedures 
(Aiken & West, 1991). We first regressed the dependent variable on performance 
condition and climate condition. Then, we re-estimated the model adding more proximal 
predictors, and re-estimated again with the interaction terms.   
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 6, 7a, and 7b about here 
------------------------------------------ 
Results from ordinary least squares (OLS) regression offered support for 
Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. Participants appraised a team member as significantly 
more beneficial and more threatening if their performance was high versus average (β = 
.24, p < .01 and β = .23, p < .01, respectively). To assess peers constructive social 
behavior toward the focal performance as a function of his/her performance and 




First, we examined participants’ decision to share information (with the focal performer 
v. other peer) based on their perceptions of benefit and threat. Lending support to 
Hypothesis 3, controlling for condition, perceptions of benefit were positively related to 
sharing information with the focal performer rather than the other peer (b = .27, S.E. = 
.15; p < .01). The odds ratio was 1.31, demonstrating that peers who perceived their peer 
a one unit more beneficial to their access to resources were 1.31 times more likely to 
choose to share with the focal performer rather than the other peer. Second, we tested to 
whom participants offered an additional opportunity (focal performer v. other peer) as a 
function of their perceptions. Similarly, controlling for condition, results showed a 
positive relationship between peer benefit perceptions and electing to offer the 
opportunity to the focal performer (b = .28, S.E. = .17; p < .01) with the odds ratio 
indicating that peers were 1.32 times more likely to invite the focal performer, controlling 
for performance condition. Lastly, we calculated the indirect effect of performance 
condition on each of these variables. Using MacKinnon and colleagues MCFAM 
approach (2004), results indicated significant indirect effects for high performer 
condition on these two support behaviors: shared information and offered opportunity 
(.065; CI90 = [.004; .141], .076; CI90 = [.002; .149], respectively). 
To test whether these effects were moderated by cooperative climate (Hypothesis 
7), we enter we estimated these models with the additional step adding the hypothesized 
moderator, cooperative climate, and the interaction term.  Effects were not significant, 
leaving Hypothesis 7 unsupported: the positive relationship between peers’ appraisal of a 
teammate as a benefit and the support they provide him/her, as either shared information 




7b summarizes these logistic regression results. 
Hypothesis 4 predicted that perceptions that an individual was a threat to 
participants’ resources would positively related to social undermining. In a lab context, 
we examined this as participants’ response to social undermining. In line with this 
hypothesis, perceptions of threat to resources positively predicted more destructive 
treatment for the focal performer (β = .12; p < .05). Further, we calculated indirect 
effects using the same approach as Study A (cf. MacKinnon et al., 2004), which showed 
a positive, significant indirect effect for performance condition on social undermining 
(.034; CI90 = [.030; .035]).  
Examining Hypothesis 8, moderated regression results were contrary to 
expectations but in line with the surprising effect of Study A: more cooperative climates 
strengthened the positive relationships between threat perceptions and social 
undermining (β = .15; p < .05). Analysis of simple slopes (cf. Aiken & West, 1991) 
revealed that the relationship between perceptions of resource threat and more negative 
response to social undermining was significantly positive in both high and low 
cooperative climates. However, higher cooperative climate significantly strengthen the 
relationship (high cooperative climate; b = 1.08, S.E. = .43; p < .01; low cooperative 
climate; b = .66, S.E. = .25; p < .05;). Figure 3 illustrates this interaction. Converging 
with the field study, this implies that peers are more likely to penalize higher performing 
members who they view as resource threatening when expectations of cooperation are 
higher, perhaps because there are viewed as more deviant from the group standard. Table 
8 shows the indirect effect of high performance condition on social undermining in high 




SECTION 2.8: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
We sought to offer a contextualized view of how individual high performance—
one of the most valued organizational commodities—can prove paradoxical: facilitating 
favorable economic consequences but a mix of favorable and unfavorable social 
consequences for individuals. Findings from our multi-wave, multi-source, multilevel 
field study highlighted an even more challenging social dynamic for high performers: 
through its effect on peer perceptions—higher performance was positively and 
significantly related to social undermining. Results from our experiment also revealed 
when higher performers were undermined, peers were more likely to continue the vicious 
cycle of undermining rather than defense performer—holding all else constant.  
In the team lab context, higher performers received support in the form of more 
information and opportunities. However, contrary to expectations, findings suggested that 
there might not be an upside to balance the social equation for high performers, as higher 
performance was negatively related to more social, non-task related forms of support in 
the field. Results may imply that higher performers receive less social support due to less 
perceived need rather than peers’ intentional withholding support.  
We also found that high performers are not without recourse. Increasing focus 
toward benefiting others and espousing prosocial motives significantly buffered higher 
performers from being viewed as threatening and being socially undermined, while a 
more cooperative climate was insufficient to shelter higher performers from social 
undermining. Rather, results interestingly suggested that more highly cooperative 





Our theoretical model and findings offer several important contributions to extant 
research. First, we leverage theoretical principles of conservation of resources—as well 
as integrate tenets of social appraisal and exchange—to offer a view of how coworkers 
respond to high performers. In doing so, we shift the focus toward how performance 
impacts performers socially rather than how it economically advantages them. Our 
findings caution performers to consider the broader costs in light of the benefits of 
striving to excel. Specifically, we found that across eighty groups, higher performance 
sparked more social undermining but in parallel did not necessarily earn higher 
performers more social support. This finding accords with persistent evidence that 
individuals asymmetrically balance potential threats over benefits (Taylor, 1991; 
Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001), and that perceived resource loss 
outweighs resource gain when individuals decide how to act (Hobfoll, 2001; Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979).  
The results also revealed an intriguing pattern: being viewed as beneficial to 
peers’ access to resources may earn one instrumental, work related support, but it does 
not earn higher performers the socio-emotional support of peers, as demonstrated in the 
field. This seemed crucial to understand better, since social support is one of most robust 
predictors of not only well-being but also long term work-related success metrics (for 
review, Achor, 2010; Halbesleben, 2006; Viswesvaran et al., 1999). Moreover, this may 
indicate that peers expect those who carry benefit to the group should be the ones giving 
rather than receiving support. Receiving social support from peers may hinge more upon 
perceived needs of group members, rather than perceived social debts owed to high 




Individuals reap financial rewards for higher levels of performance, but the increasingly 
social nature of work environments necessitates support from others (Seibert et al., 2001). 
Certainly, strong and consistent performance benefits individual careers. However, as the 
nature of work grows more complex and increasingly requires supportive networks to 
accomplish work, high performers must form high quality bonds with their coworkers 
(Dutton & Heaphy, 2003; Spreitzer, Sutcliffe, Dutton, Sonenshein, & Grant, 2005) and 
develop social capital (Seibert et al., 2001) in order to sustain high achievement and long-
term thriving at work. The significant, negative indirect effect of performance on social 
support in the field may also reflect the lack of opportunities—real or perceived—that 
peers have to offer support to high performers. This may mean that when high performers 
need support, they profit when those needs are made known. Rather, in the context of day 
to day work, where peers have to make trade-offs on where to spend their time, they may 
gravitate to helping relatively lower performers instead. Future investigation on the 
rationale and justification for withholding support from higher performing peer would be 
interesting to shed light on this “lonely at the top” sentiment and complementary to work 
that has demonstrated that people enjoy seeing top performers fail (Feather, 1994) while 
they prefer to see underdogs succeed (Vandello, Goldschmied, & Richards, 2007). 
Third, we add to the growing body of literature on destructive behaviors. Scholars 
have directed increased attention toward study of antisocial behaviors (e.g., Glomb & 
Liao, 2003; Duffy et al., 2012) and specifically encourage greater attention toward 
understanding determinants and contextual factors that shape antisocial behavior (e.g., 
Duffy, O’Leary-Kelly, & Ganster, 2003; Duffy et al., 2006; Robinson & Greenberg, 




individuals (Bendersky & Hays, 2012; Groysberg, Polzer, & Elfenbein, 2011). Our 
findings underscored the importance of considering how performance impacts social 
dynamics and also unearthed mechanisms that drive antisocial behaviors. 
Fourth, our inquiry highlights both the potential and the complexity of prosocial 
characteristics: more prosocial high performers shielded themselves from exposure to 
negative social consequences behaviors, while more prosocial (i.e., cooperative) contexts 
seemed to require more from high performers. High prosocial motives buffered high 
performers both from being viewed as threatening and from being the target of social 
undermining. We found in Study A that prosocial motives advantaged higher performers 
by reducing how threatening they were perceived, however, did not enhance how 
beneficial they were viewed. The imbalance of this moderating effect is likely due to the 
fact that negative features of stimuli draw more attention and spark more thorough 
information processing compared with positive features (Baumeister, et al., 2001). 
Situations of increased threat heighten the need for sensemaking (Weick, 1995) and fuel 
information seeking (Gino, Sharek, & Moore, 2011), whereas in situations where loss is 
not salient, additional explanation is less critical (e.g., Bies & Shapiro, 1988).  
Our study also joins research (e.g., Grant et al., 2009) showing that employees 
who are prosocially motivated not only experienced gains that could benefit others but 
also carried instrumental benefits for themselves by enhancing how others view their 
contributions. Interestingly, higher cooperative climates strengthened the negative 
relationship between being viewed as a benefit and social support received. This may 
indicate that, in more cooperative workgroups, higher performance is viewed as a 




such deviance, albeit positive deviance, as a risk to the quality of the social space.  
Finally, our study offers a balance to recent theoretical and empirical accounts of 
how peers respond to poorly performing members within their workgroup (e.g., LePine & 
Van Dyne, 2001; Jackson & LePine, 2003; Ferguson et al., 2010). Peers often account for 
the majority of daily interactions at work and disproportionately impact work experience 
(Morgeson & Humphrey, 2006). Acknowledging this, work has addressed how peers 
attribute poor performance and, in turn, whether they confront, train, compensate for, or 
avoid low performing colleagues in order to help the workgroup (LePine & Van Dyne, 
2001; Jackson & LePine, 2003). Studies by Ferguson, Ormiston, and Moon (2010) 
indicated that peers were more inhibited to approach colleagues about their performance 
when they saw them as more powerful. Our findings indicate that high performance also 
meaningfully shapes peer responses and perceptions that what give rise to such 
behaviors. Evidence from our initial experiment indicated that high performers may 
actually find themselves triggering more polarizing peer perceptions compared to lower 
performing colleagues. Studies have demonstrated that peers derive pleasure when they 
see high achievers get knocked down (i.e., tall poppies; Feather, 1994; 2012) and elect 
more harmful behaviors toward smarter individuals and classmates (Kim & Glomb, 2010; 
Peterson & Ray, 2006). We join this thread of research and extend knowledge of social 
benefits and risks faced by individuals based on the quality of their performance. Further 
knitting these theoretical perspectives together to understand how peers treat performers 
who are negatively deviance v. positively deviate, may prove both interesting and of 





Findings highlight several challenges for high performers, managers, and human 
capital leaders. First, our study reveals to high performers that both their work efforts and 
their motives are likely to shape how peers treat them. Results revealed the unexpected 
instrumental value of caring—and making clear that you care—about others. We do not 
suggest that high performers feign prosocial motives simply to earn themselves more 
favorable social treatment. In fact, this approach may backfire, as peers are quite 
discerning of disingenuous motives (Eastman, 1994). However, being more open about 
genuine care and concern felt for others and expressing behaviors that are congruent with 
prosocial motives may carry an unanticipated benefit for high performers. Namely, it can 
buffer them from poor social treatment. Conversely, high performers who are naturally 
more self-oriented may thrive better in more competitive environments (Lazear, 1998). 
Results also imply that high performance reduces the social support peers offer, unless 
perhaps supervisors make it clear that high performers are in need of support. Equipped 
with this understanding, high performers might benefit from more actively seeking social 
support and better articulating their own challenges and work needs. 
Second, managers should be mindful of how performance differences shape social 
dynamics. Cultivating and protecting positive interactions within workgroups is an 
important managerial responsibility, and yet leaders are also likely to underestimate the 
harmful effects that performance differences have on the workgroup (Groysberg, Nanda, 
& Noria, 2004). Findings caution managers against (1) forming a workgroup without 
consideration of the performance composition and (2) ignoring how existing performance 
differences affect the group. For managers who see instances of social undermining 




coworkers see one another as a threat to their resources.  
Third, we should also caution managers against protecting group harmony at all 
costs; discouraging high performance or suppressing performance differences will make 
it difficult for the group to attract and retain highly capable and motivated individuals. In 
addition, justifying social undermining behavior in the name of protecting a positive 
group dynamic will only exacerbate a toxic social environment and dampen motivation to 
enhance performance. As a result, group members may be on good terms with each other, 
but group performance suffers. Recent reports indicate high performers are the most 
difficult employees to retain (cf. Martin & Schmidt, 2010), and this phenomenon has 
often been reasoned to be due to increased opportunities elsewhere (cf. Human Capital 
Institute Report, 2009). However, we offer a potential alternative explanation for these 
trends. Since peer relationships are critical to the quality of employees’ work experience 
(Chiaburu & Harrison, 2008), the disheartening social treatment from peers may be 
eroding high performers’ commitment to their workgroups. Therefore, our findings 
suggest that managers should provide social attention, as opposed to just economic 
rewards to high performers, as they are often excluded from peer social support and 
targets of peer social undermining behavior.  
Limitations and Future Research 
The contributions of this research should be viewed in light of its limitations, 
which we hope offer several promising avenues of further inquiry. First, we focused on 
how higher performers are viewed by peers with respect to their own resource access. We 
focused investigation of on social and material resources broadly, with findings 




significantly related. However, these findings point toward what seems an important 
follow-up question: whether specific types of resources are considered more or less 
sensitive to the impact of higher performers. Hobfoll (1989; 2001) delineated resources 
as material, social, or personal. It would be interesting for future research to explore 
whether higher performers influence peer perceptions of specific resources to varying 
magnitudes and also whether serving as a perceived benefit or threat to one type of 
resource is more predictive of social responses than other types. Such an approach may 
facilitate examination of additional individual differences of both the performer and the 
peer that may moderator effects revealed by our research. For example, a higher 
performer may trigger unfavorable comparison that affects the self-confidence of some 
peers (a personal resource; cf. Hobfoll, 2001) more than it affects, for example, their 
ability to get the work shifts they prefer (material resources)—an effect that may be 
amplified for peers who generally hold lower opinions of themselves or are more self-
critical (i.e., low core self-evaluation; Judge, Erez, Bono, & Thorenson, 2003). 
Second, we focused on how social motives of performers contributed to how they 
were viewed and treated. We did so in order to stress the value of being viewed as 
prosocial and to offer a potential remedy within the performers’ control. It may be 
interesting to turn the tables and examine how peers’ social motives moderate both their 
perceptions and their social treatment of higher performers. For example, peers who are 
more self-interested and status conscious may also be more sensitive to potential threats 
(Blader & Chen, 2011) and therefore more motived to protect their own interests by 
acting against high performers. Conversely, self-interested peers may find higher 




high performers’ efforts as self-seeking or disruptive to solidarity (i.e., incongruent to 
their own social motives) and therefore more punitively judge performers. To extend 
understanding, it would be interesting to consider how matching of performer and peers’ 
social motives affect consequences experienced by the performer. 
Third, we examined social consequences of high performance in a context of 
moderate rewards and task interdependence. We did so in an attempt to reflect the 
context in which many employees find themselves. It would be fascinating to see how 
this phenomenon would unfold within more interdependent contexts (i.e., teams) or less 
interdependent contexts (i.e., sales groups). Greater interdependence may encourage 
peers to view high performers as more beneficial and less threatening, since individual 
effectiveness adds value to the collective no matter if team success is simply aggregated 
efforts of members or complex orchestration of teamwork (Kozlowski et al., 1999). 
However, team members often work more proximally due to increased interdependence, 
which could create more opportunities to perceived performance disparity, increasingly 
salience of the threat and benefit a high performing team member can pose to shared 
resources. Less interdependence may polarize peers regarding high performers: some 
may view them as appropriately acting toward their own interests, while others may see 
them as more directly competing with them. Varying the level of interdependence among 
peers to address these questions may further enrich understanding of how high 
performance affects peer perceptions and, in turn, expression of those perceptions as 





An old adage explains “it’s lonely at the top” and a Japanese proverb warns higher 
performers that “the nail that sticks up gets hammered down.” Our research sheds light 
on the often-ignored social challenges these expressions imply and broadens 
understanding of the spectrum of consequences for high performance as well as 
mechanisms that begin to explain why. Findings emphasize cooperative group contexts 
may be insufficient to protect high performers from being targets; however, their own 
motives might serve to shield them. We hope this inquiry stimulates further efforts to 
understand the impact of performance on social dynamics and inform high performers 













CHAPTER 3: ESSAY 2 – STAR STRUCK: THE EFFECT OF HIGH 
PERFORMERS ON PEER PROACTIVE MOTIVATION AND PERFORMANCE  
SECTION 3.1. INTRODUCTION & CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT 
Teams offer a number of advantages including increased flexibility and broader 
capability to cope with complexity, which help to explain why teams have fast become 
the principal unit of work (Kozlowski & Bell, 2013; Sundstrom, DeMuse, & Futrell 
1990). However, the synergy thought to be the hallmark of teams often remains elusive. 
Instead, teams often experience process loss or loss in productivity (Ilgen & Pulakos, 
1999). For teams to fulfill their potential and serve their organizations effectively, 
members must develop, orchestrate, and combine their inputs to offer contributions that 
exceed beyond just the sum of the parts (Kozlowski et al., 1999). In the context of teams, 
it becomes increasingly important for individual members to speak up, make a case for 
their viewpoints, integrate their responsibilities with others, and make things happen in 
order to operate effectively (Grant & Ashford, 2008; Griffin, Neale, & Parker, 2007). 
While supervisors may not always welcome such proactivity (Frese & Fay, 2001), 
understanding how to motivate proactive contributions from team members and 
encourage them to take initiative carries important managerial implications for teams. 
Parker and colleagues (2010) introduced proactive motivation as a core 
antecedent of individual proactive contributions. Proactive motivation describes 
motivational states comprised of members’ sense that they can, have reason to, and are 
energized to generate goals and strive to mobilize and affect change (Parker, Bindl, & 
Strauss, 2010). Yet, we know little about how team inputs affect the proactive motivation 




inputs to individual proactivity have focused on work design (e.g., Fuller, Marler, & 
Hester, 2006) and leadership behaviors (e.g., Chen, Farh, Campbell, Wu, & Wu, 2013; 
van Knippenberg, van Knippenberg, De Cremer, & Hogg, 2004). Still, we lack valuable 
understanding of how team composition shapes the proactive motivation of team 
members. This is surprising, given that (1) composition of member differences can exert 
powerful influence on the motivation of members (Harrison & Klein, 2007) and (2) team 
composition and staffing decisions represent one of the more tractable ways leaders can 
influence teams.  
I seek to redress this gap, in part, by extending theoretical and practical 
understanding of how team composition affects whether individual proactive disposition 
(i.e., personal initiative) manifests as proactive motivation.  Specifically, my goal in this 
essay is to propose and test a model examining how the presence of a high performer in a 
team impacts the proactive motivation of teammates. The purpose of this inquiry is to 
advance research on proactivity with the emphasis of how the composition of team 
members can serve as an important moderating context. I expect that proactive 
individuals—or those higher in personal initiative, (i.e., natural inclination toward 
behaviors that are self-starting, proactive, and persistent in overcoming barriers; Frese & 
Fay, 2001)—will experience more proactive motivation. Namely, individuals higher in 
personal initiative will consider themselves more efficacious, feel more responsible for 
the accomplishment of team goals, and also feel less inhibited to proactively contribute to 
the team task. These three psychological states map to the core motivational processes 
that comprise proactive motivation, which drives effort toward proactive contributions 




However, I propose that the presence of a high performer creates a strong 
situation that is likely to constrain the expression of peer proactivity. Central components 
of individual proactivity include anticipating issues and planning ways to contribute. I 
expect that, in teams, high performers weaken the confidence proactive peers have in 
their ability to contribute, alleviated the self-imposed pressure they place on themselves 
to take initiative, and temper their energies to contribute. These arguments find their 
theoretical root in trait activation theory, which advances the idea that cues within work 
contexts can strengthen or attenuate the expression of traits as motivation and, 
subsequently, behaviors (TAT; Tett & Burnett, 2003).  
In the sections that follow, I develop arguments related to how the addition of a 
high performer can reduce proactive motivation of proactive peers and test this model in 
a team lab experiment and a virtual team simulation (see Figure 3). Through this inquiry, 
I seek to make several important theoretical contributions to the literature on proactivity 
and team composition.  First, by drawing on recent theoretical developments related to 
proactive motivation (Parker, Bindl, & Straus, 2010), I direct attention to a how 
members’ proactive contributions can be influenced by differences in team 
composition—namely, the performance disparity created by the high performer. In doing 
so, I illustrate the potential value in tighter integration between with teams literature and 
literature examining the impact of situation-trait combinations (e.g., Tett & Guterman, 
2000)—specifically, how such integration can expand our understanding of member 
motivation and contributions. Second, I highlight how teams research can gain from 
alternative and more specific consideration of composition and diversity in work groups 




literature (e.g., Harrison, Price, Gavin, & Florey, 2002), but there still has been almost no 
investigation of member differences beyond demographic or personality attributes. My 
study aims to demonstrate the value of examining patterns of member characteristics and 
their consequences beyond categories to those that explicitly consider composition of 
socially valued attributes.  
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
 
SECTION 3.2. PERSONAL INTIATIVE, HIGH PERFORMERS, AND 
PROACTIVE MOTIVATION 
Personal initiative refers to the persistent, stable proclivity that predisposes 
individuals toward proactivity, self-starting initiative, and persistence (Frese & Fay, 
2001; Kring, Soose, & Zempel, 1996). Proactive individuals are likely to effect change 
and contribute beyond the status quo within teams (Grant & Ashford, 2008; Griffin et al., 
2007). Growing evidence has linked dispositional proactivity to proactive contributions 
and performance, such as taking charge and voice (e.g., Parker & Collins, 2010; for 
quantitative review, Fuller & Marler, 2009).  
This proactive disposition-performance relationship can be explained through the 
lens of motivation, a more proximal predictor of behavior and performance (Kanfer & 
Heggestad, 1997). In their theory of proactive motivation, Parker and colleagues 
delineated three psychological states that compose proactive motivation, theorizing that 
proactive motivation is the product of individual self-reflection on three questions: Can I 
do it?  Should I do it?  Am I energized to do it? (Parker, Bindl, & Strauss, 2010). 




high on personal initiative are likely to experience greater proactive motivation as 
composed of greater sense of self-efficacy, increased felt responsibility, and reduced 
social inhibition. Supporting this view, studies have linked these proactive dispositions to 
heightened context-specific self-efficacy (Chen et al, 2013; Parker, Williams, & Turner, 
2006), suggesting that personal initiative is likely to impact individual appraisal of  “can 
I” proactively contribute. Research has demonstrated that more proactive individuals are 
also more likely to take on greater responsibility (Parker & Ohly, 2008) and feel 
responsible for change (Fuller, Marler, & Hester, 2006). This suggests that degree of 
individual personal initiative is likely to influence appraisal of “should I” proactively 
contribute. Personal initiative is considered the opposite to reactive tendencies, and the 
self-starting nature of individuals high in personal initiative is considered to be influenced 
more by internal drive to contribute rather than external pressures (Frese & Fay, 2001).  
Consequently, I expect personal initiative to negatively relate to social inhibition, 
influencing peer appraisal of whether they “are energized to” proactively contribute.  
Hypothesis 1. In a team context, peers’ personal initiative (i.e., proactive disposition) will 
positively relate to their proactive motivation as represented by (a) increased state self-
efficacy, (b) increased felt responsibility, and (c) decreased social inhibition. 
Personal initiative shares considerable conceptual space with to proactive 
personality (Grant & Parker, 2009), which refers to the stable individual tendency to 
cause environmental change (Bateman & Crant, 1993; Crant & Bateman 2000). 
However, while Crant and Bateman’s conceptualization of proactive personality is 
unlikely to be influenced by the context (2000), Frese and Fay offer arguments and 




by some work contexts, for instance those that are more complex or those that limit 
control (2001). Consistent with this view, in their theory of proactive motivation, Parker 
and colleagues content that individual disposition will positively relate to proactive 
motivation, but that contextual variables will interact with this individual difference to 
affect motivation (2010).  
Individuals high in personal initiative need opportunity and motivation to express 
their proactive tendency as proactive contributions. I expect that having a high performer 
on the team reduces how affirmatively teammates to respond to the question of “Can I, 
should I, and am I energized to contribute?” I expect that the presence of a high 
performer to create a social context that weakens the positive link between peers’ 
dispositional proactivity and their belief in their own ability (i.e., state self-efficacy; 
Bandura, 1997). With a high performer on the team, proactive peers may be likely to 
make unfavorable social comparison that can negatively affect their sense of capability 
(Lam et al., 2011; Mussweiler, Rüter, & Epstude, 2004). I also expect that the presence of 
a high performer to temper proactive peers’ sense of personal accountability (i.e., felt 
responsibility; Hackman & Oldham, 1976; 1980). At minimum, proactive peers are likely 
to see higher performers as members who should share responsibility for taking initiative. 
Lastly, I expect the presence of a high performer to weaken the negative link between 
proactive disposition and feelings reservation, hesitation, and social discomfort (i.e., 
social inhibition; Mattick & Clark, 1998). Even though more proactive peers are thought 
to be less concerned with speaking up or taking charge (Bateman & Crant, 1993; 




assumption that a high performer offers expertise to which they should defer. I base these 
premises on trait-activation theory. 
Trait-activation theory delineates the ways in which organizational contexts 
moderate how personality, disposition, and abilities manifest as behavior and 
performance (Tett & Burnett, 2003). According to Tett and Burnett, weak situations lend 
themselves to the most variance in trait-expressive behavior, while “strong situations” 
(cf. Mischel & Shoda, 1995) and contexts are thought to exert “press” on expression of 
traits (2003). When the work context contains more trait-relevant cues, individual 
characteristics like dispositions are more likely to be activated and behavior is more 
likely to manifest in trait-consistent ways. Such cues are considered facilitators. In 
contrast, features of the environment or situation can also attenuate expression of a trait. 
These contextual cues are considered constraints. For instance, an initial legal 
consultation with a potential client is likely to interact with an attorney’s personality trait 
of agreeableness because, in this context, it is valuable for the attorney to understand and 
empathize with the potential client’s situation, to encourage openness, and to build 
rapport. Conversely, cues in trial court proceedings are likely to constrain the same 
attorney’s agreeableness from expression, since agreeable behaviors would be counter to 
goal at hand: successful argument of the client’s case.  
Social cues within the environment can serve as powerful trait-relevant cues for 
members working collectively on tasks (Tett & Burnett, 2003). I expect that a high 
performer creates a strong situation and introduces features to the contexts that constrain 
their peers’ personal initiative from manifesting as proactive motivation and proactive 




introduces to social context is likely to undermine proactive individuals’ sense of self-
efficacy. Studies spanning the social comparison literature have empirically linked 
unfavorable social comparisons to reduced self-efficacy (e.g., Bandura & Jourden, 1991).  
For example, HIV patients who were exposed to an upward comparison (i.e., someone of 
better health) reported less self-efficacy in managing their health (Bogart, Gray-
Bernhardt, Catz, Hartmann, & Otto-Salaj, 2002). Study of clinical rotations in medical 
school showed that students estimated their abilities significantly lower if they were in 
the presence of a high performing peer (Raat, Kuks, van Hell, & Cohen-Schotanus, 
2013). 
Second, I expect that high performers constrain the natural inclination of 
proactive individuals to feel responsible for the team success. More proactive individuals 
tend to scan the environment to anticipate issues to which they can apply their initiative 
(Grant & Ashford, 2009). In the presence of a high performer, I expect that proactive 
peers are likely to perceive fewer opportunities to contribute, believing that needs of the 
team are already being met—or are likely to be met—by the high performer. With less 
team needs to address, proactive individuals may consider their contributions as 
comparatively expendable, which is likely to decrease their sense of accountability (Kerr 
& Brunn, 1983). Moreover, they may perceive that it is better for the team if they defer to 
the high performer’s expertise, believing is it better for him or her to assume the burden 
of greater responsibility (Fuller, et al. 2006). 
Third, perceived capabilities of a high performer can serve as a social cue that 
dampens proactive energies to contribute. The unfavorable social comparison that high 




to contribute and to draw their focus off-task toward consideration of their performance 
comparison (Tesser, Millar, & Moore, 1988). Consistent with this view, research 
indicated that colleagues experience more withdrawal and social inhibition when making 
upward comparisons (Cohen-Charash, 2009). The presence of a high performer may also 
prompt proactive peers to intentionally self-censure their expression of proactivity out of 
concern that their task efforts may invite greater comparison.  
Hypothesis 2. In a team context, the presence of a high performer attenuates the positive 
relationship between peers’ personal initiative and proactive performance.  
Hypothesis 3. In a team context, the presence of a high performer weakens (a) the 
positive effect of proactive disposition on state self-efficacy, (b) the positive effect of 
proactive disposition on felt responsibility, and (c) the negative effect of proactive 
disposition on social inhibition. 
 
SECTION 3.4. MOTIVATING PROACTIVE PERFORMANCE 
With increase in interdependence between colleagues and decrease in role 
differentiation, scholars have called for wider consideration of what constitutes 
performance (e.g., Ilgen & Poulakos, 1999; Welbourne et al., 1998). In response to this, 
Griffin and colleagues (2007) advanced a model that specifies proactive behaviors as an 
important performance dimension for individuals who work dynamically with colleagues. 
Thus, this dimension of performance seems especially relevant for individual who work 
in teams. Individual proactive performance describes member contributions that are self-
starting, future-oriented, and aimed to improve upon the status quo (Griffin et al., 2007). 
Proactive performance can take form generally as identifying opportunities for 




ways such as offering up creative ideas, analyzing problems, outlining steps for how the 
team can plan and approach work, and advocating (i.e., issue-selling) to members of 
one’s team (Crant, 2000; Fuller, Marler, & Hester, 2006; Grant & Ashford, 2008). 
At its core, proactive performance involves contributing to work goals by 
challenging and improving the current way that things are done. Therefore, dependent on 
how it manifests, proactive performance has the potential to create interpersonal strain, be 
viewed as deviant, or be considered threatening (e.g., Liang, Farh, & Farh, 2012; 
Morrison, Wheeler-Smith, & Kamdar, 2011; Stamper & Van Dyne, 2001; Warren, 2003). 
Consequently, I expect proactive motivation to serve as a critical antecedent to individual 
proactive performance in teams. Theoretical frameworks advanced by Parker and 
colleagues (2010) guide this argument. The antecedents to proactivity delineated by 
Grant and Ashford (2008) also describe three analogous psychological mechanisms that 
explain whether individuals will be proactive. Namely, they argue that proactivity occurs 
when individuals experience greater efficacy, when accountability is induced, and when 
proactive action can reduce uncertainty.  
Following these perspectives, I expect that proactive motivation—as specifically 
reflected by increased state self-efficacy, increased felt responsibility, and decreased 
social inhibition—drives peers’ proactive contribution to their team. State self-efficacy 
fuels peers’ willingness to contribute and act to advance team’s goals (Stajkovic & 
Luthans, 1998). I expect team members who experience greater efficacy carry the 
confidence that is sometimes needed to cope with the potential consequences of proactive 
behaviors. However, even when people feel able to offer proactive contributions, they 




responsibility, I expect team members to be more inclined toward acting proactively 
since fulfillment responsibilities is likely viewed as a benefit, while falling short of 
responsibilities likely viewed as a loss. Simultaneously, even if individuals believe 
themselves capable of proactive contribution, and interested to perform proactively, they 
have must feel energized to do so (Parker et al., 2010). However, when peers feel greater 
social inhibition, this energy wanes.   
Studies from several streams of literature offer direct and indirect support for 
these arguments. First, studies of voice have indicated that employees’ believe their 
efforts will succeed in accomplishing something, they increase their willingness to enact 
voice behaviors, a form of proactive performance (for review, Morrison, 2014). In 
tandem, research on issue-selling suggests that that when employees’ sense that they are 
more capable, they are more likely to be proactive (e.g., Ashford, Rothbard, Piderit, & 
Dutton, 1998). Second, Morrison and Phelps (1999) offered evidence that individuals 
who experience a sense of responsibility are more likely to take charge. Graham 
contended that when individuals feel a strong sense of responsibility, they may perceive it 
as costly not to take initiative (1986). In a field study of utility providers, Fuller, Marler, 
and Hester (2006) linked felt responsibility for constructive change to employees’ 
behavior and continuous improvement efforts. Third, when people experience increased 
social consciousness and anxiety that characterized social inhibition, they are inclined to 
reduce engagement or withhold communication (e.g., Daly & Stafford, 1994). 
Hypothesis 4. In a team context, team members’ proactive motivation (as comprised of 
increased self-efficacy, greater felt responsibility, and reduced social inhibition) 




Hypothesis 5. In a team context, the presence of high performer will moderates the 
mediated relationships between proactive disposition and proactive performance via 
increased self-efficacy, greater felt responsibility, and reduced social inhibition such that 
the mediated relationships will be weaker with a high performer than without one. 
METHODS 
Overview of Studies 
Scholars have identified several factors that meaningfully influence proactive 
motivation, such as job design (Grant & Parker, 2009), leadership styles (Chen, Farh, 
Campbell, Wu, & Wu, 2013), and resource access (Fuller et al., 2006). Therefore, to 
isolate the focal phenomenon, it seemed most prudent to examine hypotheses within a 
controlled setting. The experimental context increases confidence in the causal order of 
the chain and helps rule out alternative explanatory mechanisms. To test the hypothesized 
relationships, I conducted two experimental studies.  
First, Study C takes the form of an interactive team experiment in which members 
received information about one another’s past performance on an individual pre-
assessment task and then were asked to work together on an open-ended team design 
project. The object of Study C was to conduct an initial test of the theoretical contention 
that the presence of a high performer constrains their proactive peers from manifesting as 
proactive performance. It carried the advantage of placing participants in an actual team 
and engaging in teamwork. This increased the psychological realism of the context.  
Second, Study D took the form of an individual experiment in which I simulated a 
virtual team context where participants were led to believe that they were engaging with 




was to constructively replicate Study C and to specifically examine the motivational 
mechanisms that drive the proposed effect. Study D also enabled a highly controlled 
environment and clean manipulation and eliminated the argument that results of Study C 
may be influenced by variance in the behavior of other team members (i.e., the high 
performers). 
SECTION 3.4. STUDY C: TEAM EXPERIMENT  
METHODS 
Purpose and Sample 
Participants consisted of undergraduate students enrolled in management courses. 
For Part 1 of the Study C, participants completed a pre-survey of individual difference 
measures (i.e., personal initiative and demographics) and a series of assessment-based 
tasks: the remote associates test (cf. Mednick, 1962), unusual uses task (cf. Guilford, 
1967), and a fabricated test of “innovative judgment.” The purpose of this assessment 
was to enable a credible manipulation of participant performance results when they came 
to the lab for Part 2. Their actual scores on this battery of tests were not calculated or 
used. For Part 2, participants arrived to scheduled lab sessions chosen based on their 
availability.  Upon arrival, they learned that this was an open-ended team task. 
Participants were incentivized to work well as a team because the top performing teams 
earned $150 with each of the three members receiving $50. 
Design, Manipulations, and Procedures 
The experimental portion of the study was one hour in duration. Upon arrival, the 
experimenter asked participants to read a sheet that explained the task and objectives (see 




with researchers from the School of Engineering to better understand the innovative 
process in design teams. The experimenter then told each participant that they will be 
assigned to a team, asked their name, and notified them that she will soon be bringing 
them their performance feedback from the portion of the task that they completed online.  
Participants were randomly assigned to a condition in which one of them was 
construed to be a high performer or not. Participants were assigned to their position by 
shuffling nametags in advance of affixing them to performance report envelopes 
containing manipulated performance information. The experimenter returned with 
envelopes, one with each participant’s name and nametag on it, which contained a score 
of their performance on the online tasks and assessment as well as the score of their 
peers. Randomly assigned focal performers received either a 3 of 10 (control condition, 
no high performer present) or a 9 of 10 (experimental condition, high performer present) 
on the performance evaluation.  The two other participants received a 3 out of 10 and 
became the focal peers in the experiment. The combination of performance feedback 
combinations facilitated testing of main effects with the control condition was comprised 
of three low performing members (i.e., no performance disparity) and experimental 
condition comprised of two low performing member and one high performer (i.e., 
performance disparity). 
After two minutes with their packets, the experimenter requested that participants 
finish reading the task sheet and their performance report and join their team members at 
the conference table at the entrance of the research lab. Participants were reminded that 
they would be working together to design a model for an "innovative research facility in 




results from Part 1. Then, the experimenter reviewed key information of the open-ended 
team task (see Appendix B), told them that time would be tight, and asked them to begin 
working.  
They had approximately 30 minutes of action phase (cf. Mark et al., 2001) to 
accomplish the task—10 minutes to collectively come up with a creative concept, 2 
minute to give an audio pitch that summarized their design, and 14 minutes to implement 
their design using a large supply of Legos as well as give a video pitch of their model. At 
the end of task, members were asked to return to their personal cubicle to complete a 
survey about their experience within the team, their peers’ proactive performance, and 
measures to checked effectiveness of the manipulation. (Please also see Study F of Essay 
3 for more detail regarding the nature of the task). 
Measures 
All scales rely upon established measures and a Likert response scale anchored to 
1 (“Disagree strongly”) and 5 (“Agree strongly), unless otherwise specified. 
Personal Initiative. In the pre-survey, participants reported their dispositional 
proactivity with Frese and Fay’s 7-item scale of personal initiative, which is designed to 
capture individual disposition toward taking “an active and self-starting approach to work 
goals and tasks, and persisting in overcoming barriers and setback” (2001: 97). The 
measure included items such as “I actively attack problems” and “whenever there is a 
chance to get actively involved, I take it.” 
Proactive Performance. I operationalized peer proactive performance in two 
ways. First, I measured proactive performance with Griffin, Neale, and Parker’s (2007) 3-




For each member, peers were asked to rate the extent to which they agreed he or she 
“initiated better ways of doing parts of the tasks,” “came up with ideas to improve the 
way in which the team worked through the task,” and “made improvements to the team’s 
work.” I averaged across the two peer ratings of each individual since analysis indicated 
high inter-rater agreement (median rwg = .90) and excellent reliability (ICC(2) = .88). 
Second, I captured an alternative form of proactive performance using Van Dyne and 
LePine’s (1998) 4-item measure of voice behaviors. Items were “spoke up to encourage 
other members to get involved”, “introduced new ideas or modifications in procedures”, 
“tried to bring about improved strategies for the team”, and “communicated his/her 
opinion about issues even if it was different or if others disagreed.” These peer ratings 
also yielded strong agreement (median rwg = .89) and reliability (ICC(2) = .82).  
Manipulation Check. To assess whether participants were aware of their past 
performance and perceived the focal performer consistent with the manipulation, I asked 
participants how they themselves and each of their teammates scored on Part 1 of the 
task—the online portion (1 = high, 2 = medium, and 3 = low). 
Control variables. Lastly, Study C put participants in a more dynamic, social 
team environment and asked team members to rate proactive performance, making the 
measure more susceptible to social status-related biases. Therefore, guided by review of 
the literature, I captured ethnicity and gender. I recorded gender of participants in case it 
has a bearing on the relationship between personal initiative and proactive behaviors, or if 
it directly biased appraisals of these behaviors. For example, research indicated that 
having lower relative status, which performance disparity induces, creates more tension 




relative status (Eagly, Beall, & Sternberg, 2004). Also, women are also less inclined 
toward challenging-oriented behavior (i.e., voice) given that it defies traditional gender 
roles (Eagly & Crowley, 1986).  
RESULTS 
Means, standard deviations, and correlations are displayed in Table 9. Thirty-five 
teams comprised of 120 participants completed the study. I removed four teams from the 
final sample due to one of their members having advanced knowledge of the team 
simulation. The retained sample included 108 participants, 36 focal performer who were 
used to present teams with a high performer (or no) and 72 peers, whose experimental 
data were used to test effects.    
Manipulation Check 
I tested effectiveness of the manipulation with analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
using participants’ recollection of the focal performance Part 1 performance results. In 
the control condition, the focal performer was rated significantly lower (M = 1.27) than 
the focal performer in the experimental condition (M = 2.68; t(34) = 10.56; p < .001). 
Findings indicated that participants the performance difference for the focal performer 
consistent with intentions.  
Hypothesis Test 
I conducted ordinary least squared regression (OLS) to test Hypothesis 2, that 
individuals’ personal initiative would be positively related to their proactive contributions 
when there was no high performer in their team, however, this relationship would be 
negative in the presence of a high performer. First, I relied upon the moderated regression 




(operationalized as both proactive performance and voice) on the predictor.  Second, I 
regressed personal initiative, condition (dummy-code condition (0 = control condition, no 
high performer; 1 = high performance present), and their interaction term on to each 
operationalization of proactive performance. Table 10 displays these results. It is 
noteworthy that personal initiative did not significantly predict either voice or proactive 
performance. Instead, results indicated that the relationship between personal initiative 
and proactive performance was contingent upon the context, namely, whether a high 
performer is in the group.  To facilitate interpretation of the significant personal initiative 
by condition interactions on voice and proactive performance, I plotted the simple slopes 
(see Figure 5).  Following the recommendations of Aiken and West (1991), I tested 
whether these slopes were significantly difference from zero. Interestingly, analysis of 
simple slopes revealed that, in the presence of a high performer, there was a significant 
negative relationship between personal initiative (b = -.62; p < .01), and proactive 
performance (b = -.54; p < .05). However, when no high performer was present, there 
was a marginally significant positive relationship between personal initiative and voice (b 
= .33; p = .053), and a positive trend between personal initiative and proactive 
performance (b = .28; p = .10).  
In sum, these findings partially supported Hypothesis 2 and provided initial 
evidence for the broader theoretical prediction that the presence of a high performer 
constrains the expression of proactive disposition as proactive motivation. To strengthen 
confidence in the validity of these findings, it seemed important to constructively 
replicate the general effect using different measures of proactive performance and tap 




specific mechanisms in Study D.  
SECTION 3.6. STUDY D: VIRTUAL TEAM SIMULATION  
METHODS 
Purpose and Sample 
Next, I sought to test the full model in a highly controlled context in order to 
eliminate any potential influence from other members of the team (i.e., shifts in the “high 
performers” behaviors due to the manipulation) and to enable objective assessment of 
proactive performance. Participants consisted of 241 undergraduate business majors that 
were enrolled in one of their program’s capstone courses.  The students volunteered to 
participate in exchange for partial fulfillment of their course research participation 
requirement.  
Design, Manipulations, and Procedures 
For Part 1 of this two-part study, participants completed a pre-survey in which I 
obtained informed consent for the study and surveyed participants’ demographic 
information and individual differences on personal initiative. Upon completion of the 
survey, they were directed to a participant-scheduling site to sign up for the in-lab portion 
of the study, which I described as a study of leadership development and decision-making 
in virtual teams.  Part 2 took form of a two-condition, between-subjects design. The 
experiment lasted 35 minutes.   
Participants were told that this study is being conducted in conjunction with a 
leadership course for part-time MBAs. To help legitimize the rouse, I sent a reminder 
email to all enrolled participants, it was imperative that arrive on time (1) because we 




“MBA students, who serve as team leaders, be at a site at the same day and time as 
participants in order to work together”. 
This was an individual-level study, however I created a false virtual team context 
using advanced features of the Qualtrics survey tool to induce a sense of team experience 
and enhance psychological realism. Participants had no real contact with other 
participants or an “MBA student leader” but rather were responding to different pre-
constructed, pre-timed chat messages and feedback. Out of an abundance of prudence, I 
used a real first name and profile for the MBA student, and secured their permission to 
use his name, photo, and profile in case participants searched online while the study is in 
progress. 
When participants arrived to their scheduled sessions, experimenters directed 
them to a virtual workstation (i.e., cubicle with computer), notified them that they would 
be connected to other teammates and an MBA leader to work as a virtual team, and 
provided step-by-step instructions and a password for how to “log in to the virtual 
environment and connect with your team.” Once in the study, the MBA leader provided 
instructions (pre-populated text set up like an instant message chat) and informed “the 
team” that they were working as a recruitment team and would conduct resume reviews 
of job candidates in a series of rounds and would provide a strong, clear team 
recommendation that the team leader would collectively compile and deliver. To start, 
they were asked to write a short bio to introduce themselves to their three other 
teammates and leader. Once “all team members were finished” (i.e., 15 seconds after the 
participant finished), the simulation auto advanced and displayed the just-completed bio 




leader welcomed the team members, provided some background about himself, and 
outlined the task objectives.  
Next, the MBA leader sent participants a short job description for an open entry-
level management consulting role, gave them 2 minutes to review it, and then asked them 
to share their ideas via the team chat window on what types of experience or abilities 
should the team look for in resumes that would fulfill the needs of the job description. 
The simulation again presented their ideas and pre-written ideas from their teammates. 
The leader asked several clarifying questions to different members to simulate dynamic 
interaction. 
Then, the MBA team leader told them that their team had three resumes to 
consider for this position. Members were to critique all three resumes, one per round (i.e., 
three rounds). MBA leader informed participants that he would review recommendations 
and provide them some quick feedback at the end of each round so that member could 
improve their critiques in subsequent rounds. Each member of the team was given 5 
minutes per round to review the resume, evaluate the fit of the candidate, and provide 
open-ended feedback to the leader about and strengths or concerns about the candidate. 
After each round, participants completed a survey of their experience, in which I 
measured participant proactive motivational states (state self-efficacy, felt responsibility, 
and social inhibition). Then, participants received the leader’s feedback on their resume 
critique and those of their team members’ on the prior round.  
The content of the performance feedback served as the manipulation. In the 
control condition, the leader’s feedback to all four members (i.e., to the participant and 




experimental condition, the only change was that the leader offered one of the fictitious, 
virtual teammates markedly better performance feedback on his/her review (using a 
gender neutral name).  
After three rounds of resume critiques and performance feedback, the leader 
asked each participant to select their top candidate from the three resumes. Then, he 
asked the participants to help him “make the case” that he could use to justify why this is 
the best candidate, including anticipating arguments against this candidate and 
proactively identifying issues or questions his MBA classmates will raise. 
Measures 
I used established measures and six-point Likert-type response scales anchored to 
1 (“Disagree strongly”) and 6 (“Agree strongly), unless specified noted otherwise. 
Personal Initiative. I assessed personal initiative using the same approach and 7-
item measure by Frese and Fay (2001) as Study C. 
Proactive Motivation. I chose three established variables that conceptually 
mapped to the three motivational states identified by Parker and colleagues in their 
framework of proactive motivation: “can do, reason to, and energized to” (2010: 1). First, 
I used self-efficacy to capture “can do” motivation. I used Tierney and colleauges’ 3-item 
measure of creative self-efficacy (1999), adapting this measure to the context. Items 
included “I felt confident in my ability to review the resume and provide 
recommendations”, “I was good at analyzing this job applicant’s capabilities,” and “I had 
a knack for evaluating this resume.” This adaptation of items to the analytical task 
context was motivated and guided by recommendations of Morgeson and colleagues 




relevant to improve explanatory power. Second, I measured “reason to” motivation the 3 
highest factor loading of the (5-item) measure of felt responsibility developed by 
Morrison and Phelps (1999), which it based on the conceptualization by Hackman and 
Oldham (1976; 1980). Sample items were “I felt a personal sense of responsibility to 
contribute in this group” and “I felt obligated to try to introduce new ideas and contribute 
where appropriate.” Third, I operationalized “energized to” motivation using social 
inhibition, which I measured with six items adapted to the team task context from the 
short form of the Social Interaction Anxiety scale (SAIS; Mattick & Clark, 1998). The 
items selected were the subset of the scale designed to capture the social self-
consciousness dimension of social interactional anxiety. Sample items included “I was 
conscious of the way I presented myself in the team”, “I was worried about making a 
good impression in this team” , and “I felt hesitant to share my ideas.” 
Manipulation and Suspicion Checks. To verify that the manipulation achieved 
its intended effect, I asked participants to rate the performance of each peer. I leveraged 
the job-role performance scale developed by Welbourne and colleagues (1998), asking 
individuals to recall what kind of feedback the MBA leader gave each team member from 
1 (“needs improvement”) to 5 (“excellent”). Second, to assess whether participants 
believed that they were in a real virtual team, I asked them “for data integrity purposes, 
what do you think were the purposes of this study?” The vast majority (76%) of students 
believed it was about the challenge of virtual team collaboration and decision-making 
biases in resume reviews. 
Proactive Performance. The task facilitated an objective measure of participants’ 




rated quality the open-ended justifications and proactive arguments that participants 
offered to accompany their candidate recommendation (i.e., how effective was the 
participant in proactively making a case for his/her choice of applicant?). The scores, 
rated on a 7-point scale (1 = ineffective, 7 = extremely effective) were averaged into a 
composite score given that agreement (median rwg = .92) and reliability (ICC(2) = .90) 
were both excellent.  
RESULTS 
I removed 31 participants from the dataset (12.8%). Participants eliminated 
included those who either experienced technical problems during the session or 
responded that they were suspicious if they were in actual teams. The believability hinged 
partly on the students’ engagement within the simulation.  For example, if participants 
were non-communicative or offered little to no critique during the resume review round, 
they would still receive a moderate rating and reasonable qualitative comments from the 
MBA leader. In such cases where students were not trying, these qualitative comments 
would have seemed baseless. With the retained sample of 210 cases, I proceeded with 
analyses.  
Manipulation and Suspicion Checks 
Using analysis of variance (ANOVA), I checked the manipulation by condition by 
contrasting how participants reported the performance of “Jordan”—the teammate whose 
performance was manipulated. Results indicated that participants in the experimental 
(high performer) condition reported that Jordan received significantly higher performance 
ratings than participants in the control condition (M = 4.64 v. M = 3.09, respectively; 





 Table 11 presents descriptive statistics, including means, standard deviations, and 
correlations of all study variables. I dummy coded condition (0 = control, no high 
performance present; 1 = experimental, high performer present) and conducted ordinary 
least squared hierarchical regression to assess whether data supported hypotheses. Table 
12 displays the results of these tests.  
 Hypothesis 1 predicted that peers’ proactive disposition would be positively 
related to (a) self-efficacy and (b) felt responsibility, while (c) negatively related to self-
consciousness. Analyses offered support for Hypotheses 1a and 1b, but not 1c (Model 2a, 
3a, and 4a, respectively).  
Next, I followed moderated regression procedures by Aiken and West (1991) to 
examine the proposed first stage interactions of personal initiative and condition on facets 
of proactive motivation. Using their recommended two-step process, I regressed each of 
these motivational states, first, on personal initiative, then simultaneously on personal 
initiative, condition, and their interaction term. Findings indicated a significant 
interaction on each motivational state. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Tables 9 and 10 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
To understand the nature of these interactions and to examine hypotheses, I 
calculated the simple slope and tested whether they were significantly different from zero 
(cf. Aiken & West, 1991).  Hypothesis 3a proposed that the presence of a high performer 
would weaken the positive relationship between personal initiative and self-efficacy. 
Inspection of slopes offered support for this effect. The relationship between personal 




difference from zero (b = .81; p < .001) when there was no high performer in the team. 
When a high performer was present, the relationship was positive but of a lower 
magnitude and not significantly different from zero (b = .22; n.s.). Similarly, Hypothesis 
3b expected that the presence of a high performer would constrain the positive 
relationship between personal initiative and felt responsibility.  Results demonstrated that 
personal initiative and felt responsibility were positive and significant when no high 
performer was present (b = .54; p < .01), but not when a high performer was present (b = 
.02; n.s.). Next, Hypothesis 3c proposed that the presence of a high performer would 
attenuate the negative relationship between personal initiative and social inhibition. 
Examination of simply slopes revealed the opposite effect.  In the presence of a high 
performer, individuals higher on personal initiative were significantly less inhibited (b = -
.56; p < .05). In the absence of high performers, personal initiative trended positively but 
did not significantly relate to social inhibition (b = .21; n.s.) To facilitate interpretation, I 
plotted these interactions appear in Figure 6.   
To understand these effects better, I used Edwards and Lambert’s (2007) 
integrative test of moderated mediation to examine the moderated mediation models (i.e., 
personal initiative ! motivational state ! proactive performance). This bootstrapping 
approach facilitated bias-corrected estimation of first stage, second stage, indirect, and 
direct (IV ! DV) under proposed moderating conditions. Table 13 summarizes these 
effects. In sum, Hypotheses 3a and 3b received support, but not 3c. Interestingly, the 
effect was contrary to proposed hypotheses—individuals who were higher on personal 





I examined whether proactive motivation, as function of self-efficacy, felt 
responsibility, and social inhibition (reverses), positively predicted members’ 
contributions. In support of Hypothesis 4, proactive motivation positively related to both 
length of participant contribution (i.e., wordcount) of team member contributions (β = 
.14; p < .05) and independent rating of quality of proactive arguments (β = .17; p < .01). 
Lastly, I followed procedures specified by Edward and Lambert’s (2007) and results of 
tests of moderated mediation supported Hypothesis 5a and 5b: the presence of a high 
performer moderated the mediated relationship of personal initiative on proactive 
performance through (a) self-efficacy and (b) felt responsibility. However, the effect of 
personal initiative on proactive performance, through social inhibition, did not vary as 
predicted across conditions, leaving Hypothesis 5c unsupported. Table 13 displays these 
effects by stage and motivational state.  
DISCUSSION 
In this essay, I sought to address two central questions: (1) how does the presence 
of a high performer impact teammates’ motivation to take initiative?, and (2) what 
specific characteristics of team members may make them more or less susceptible to the 
motivational influence of a high performer? Integrating principles from theories of 
proactive motivation with trait activation theory, I proposed and found that high 
performers in teams constrain proactive motivation and contributions of individuals 
predisposed toward taking initiative.  Findings from these two studies highlighted that the 
presence of a high performer can significantly impact the motivation of even their highly 
proactive peers. Results demonstrated that high performers dampened the positive 




Interestingly, and contrary to predictions, the reduced social inhibition of more proactive 
peers was facilitated rather than reduced. These motivational effect also translated to less 
proactive contributions from peers who are naturally predisposed toward proactivity.   
The majority of investigations on personal initiative and its conceptual cousin, 
proactive personality, have identified how they relate to and interact with other traits 
(e.g., Grant, 2013b) and motivate behaviors at work (for quantitative review, Fuller & 
Marler, 2009). These studies have amassed evidence of the benefit of dispositional 
proactivity to motivation, valued work behaviors, and career success (Maurer & 
Chapman, 2013; Seibert et al., 2001). However, no examinations to date have identified 
and investigated contextual factors that de/activate these motivations and behaviors. It 
seems an important first step to show that more proactive individuals not only take 
initiative to shape their environment, but also that cues from their environment can also 
meaningfully diminish these contributions. As proactivity can sometime expose 
individual at work to risk (Grant & Ashford, 2008; Grant, Parker, & Collins, 2009; 
Morrison & Phelps, 1999), it would be interesting for future work to unearth additional 
proactivity-context combinations to advance understanding of whether there may be 
addition surprising consequences of proactivity in certain situations. 
Along with others, Parker and her colleagues (2006; 2010) have contributed 
greatly to cumulative knowledge on proactivity—and individual traits, contexts, and 
motivations that drive it. Still, as these and neighboring literatures have flourished, far 
less is understood about how antecedents of motivation and behavior combine to 
influence proactivity (Parker & Collins, 2009). Related, studies in the related literature on 




affect employee willingness to voice (for review, Morrison, 2014) as well as supervisor 
reception to it (Whiting, Maynes, Podsakoff et al., 2012; Zhang, Wang, & Shi, 2012). 
This seems an important next direction in which to break theoretical ground given the 
increased reliance on more relational forms of work (Chen & Tesluk, 2011; Grant & 
Parker, 2009).  
One of the unexpected findings was the nature of the interaction between peers’ 
personal initiative and the presence of a high performer on peers’ sense of social 
inhibition. Without a high performer in the team, there was no significant different on 
peers’ social inhibition as a function of their own dispositional personal initiative. When 
a high performer was in the group, social inhibition sharply declined as a function of 
personal initiative. Two things may be driving this effect. First, high performers seem to 
increase inhibition among peers who are lower in personal initiative. The high performers 
presence may actually act as a trait-facilitator of low personal initiative on social 
inhibition: those who preferred not to take charge felt even less social motivation to do so 
when there is a talent alternative in their midst.  Second, the high performer’s presence 
may simply relieve the pressure felt by high personal initiative peers: both felt 






CHAPTER 4: ESSAY 3 – WHEN DIFFERENCES CREATE DEFERENCE: PROS 
AND CONS OF MEMBER PERFORMANCE DISPARITY FOR TEAM 
INNOVATION 
SECTION 4.1. INTRODUCTION & CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT 
Innovation describes both the development of novel, useful ideas (i.e., creativity), 
and successful implementation of those ideas (West & Farr, 1990). This requires 
converting concepts into tangible products and services (Baer, 2012). As nature of work 
becomes increasingly complex, dynamic, and uncertain (Griffin, Neale, & Parker, 2007), 
innovation has become central to organizational competitiveness and growth (Lovelace, 
Shapiro, & Weingart, 2001; Prahalad & Krishnan, 2008; West & Farr, 1990). 
Consequently, scholars and practitioners alike share a common interest in unearthing 
ways to foster team innovation. As both team creativity and effective implementation are 
necessary components, team innovation requires members to both explore and exploit 
collective expertise and resources.  
More than any other unit of work, teams serve as the organizational epicenter for 
innovative performance (Anderson et al., 2004; Hülshegar, Anderson, & Salgado, 2009). 
To date, research has revealed a number of team states and processes that promote team 
innovation, including support for innovation, participative safety, and task orientation 
(for review, Hülshegar et al., 2009). Yet, we still have little by way of prescriptive 
knowledge about inputs to team innovation, especially that which would inform leaders 
how to compose teams to foster processes that fuel innovation. One noteworthy exception 
is recent research on the impact of cognitive styles (i.e., conformity and attention-to-deal) 




seems a critical omission, as composition of members (i.e., staffing) represents a tractable 
input that can shape social and task processes (Hackman, 1992; McGrath, 1964). In 
particular, team composition impacts the social hierarchy, or members’ implicit social 
standing with respect to their respective prestige, prominence, and social value (Magee & 
Galinsky, 2008).  
Social ordering in teams is ubiquitous and has “a profound impact on group 
functioning” (Anderson & Brown, 2010: 80). Social hierarchies form quickly, especially 
in the absence of formalized hierarchy (i.e., when explicit hierarchies are flatter; Fiske, 
2010; Ridgeway, 1982; Tiedens & Fragale, 2003). Typically, teams charged to innovate 
adopt a flat hierarchy or cross-functional design to promote flexibility (West & 
Anderson, 1996). This leaves them especially vulnerable to formation of salient social 
hierarchies. With the addition of a high performer to team, a steeper social hierarchy is 
likely to result since past performance serves as one of the foremost signals of status in a 
work context (Berger et al., 1977). I expect performance differentiation orders an implicit 
social structure at team formation that is likely to affect the entirety of the team 
development process, including development collective psychological states, and 
subsequently emergence of task and interpersonal processes that affect teams’ ability to 
perform and innovate (Kozlowski et al., 1999; 2009). 
While widespread agreement exists that social hierarchy is highly consequential 
to work groups and team processes, the results of the effects of social hierarchy on team 
processes performance remain equivocal (Anderson & Brown, 2010). Scholars have 
suggested that the nature of this relationship is contingent on legitimacy of the hierarchy 




Galinsky, 2011). This legitimacy seems contingent upon the nature of the team 
performance outcomes and the processes required to bring them about. For example, if 
team success principally depends upon exploiting the knowledge of an expert, a 
performance hierarchy may prove quite valuable. Consistent with this view, Bunderson 
(2003) found that teams performed better in a judgment-accuracy task when members 
were able to identify context-relevant experts and grant them influence. In this instance, 
social hierarchies promoted efficiency through exploitation and deferral, which can 
promote effective implementation—a necessary component of innovation.  
However, the first stage of innovation depends upon creative idea generation 
(Hülsheger et al., 2009; Woodman, Sawyer, & Griffin, 1993) and there is reason to 
believe performance hierarchy limits exploration among members. For instance, studies 
showed that dominance of one or a few perspectives within the team tends to hamper 
creativity (Hoever, van Knippenberg, van Ginkel, & Barkema, 2012; Paulus, 2010). The 
conflicting nature of these findings has lead scholars to advocate for greater 
understanding and empirical investigation of social hierarchy’s impact on teams (e.g., 
Anderson & Brown, 2010). Such an investigation seems particularly relevant for the 
study of team innovation. On one hand, the divergent participation is likely to maximize 
creative exploration in teams; however, on the other hand, efficient, orderly, convergent 
participation is critical for success in idea implementation. I argue that status hierarchy, 
as created by performance disparity, differentially impacts these two innovative 
pathways.  
Consequently, in Essay 3, I develop a model that delineates how performance 




pronounced social hierarchy that can both hinder and promote contrasting team processes 
that are both essential to innovative performance. To do so, I draw upon theories of team 
innovation from the management literature and, theoretical views of social motivation, 
social status, and disparity from social psychology literature.  Knit together, these 
literatures help to frame explanation of how high performers—beyond their own task 
contributions—shape the development of their teams interaction and may simultaneously 
hurt and help team processes that drive innovation.  
I propose performance disparity hampers team processes characterized by 
divergent participation (i.e., exchange of differing information, alternative ideas, 
opposing views, and differing insights across members of a team) such as task conflict 
(i.e., team member disagreement over ideas and opinions related to accomplishing the 
collective task; Jehn, 1995; 1997). In contrast, I expect that performance disparity 
promotes team processes characterized by convergent participation (i.e., efficient 
exchange, harmonization, synchronization, and coalescence efforts and ideas) such as 
team coordination (i.e., team member orchestration of the “sequence and timing of 
interdependent actions”; Marks, Mathieu, & Zaccaro, 2001: 363). Reduced divergent 
participation hinders quality and quantity of creative ideas produced in the team, while 
convergent participation enables ideas to be collectively agreed to—or at least acquiesced 
to—and then shepherded into tangible products. To explain this, I introduce the concept 
of social concerns in teams adapted from work on social inhibition, facilitation, and 
anxiety (Mattick & Clark, 1998), which describes a feeling among members of the team 
of increased social ambiguity and social anxiety, activated social attention to the social 




propose test this theoretical model in a team laboratory experiment. Figure 7 graphically 
summarizes this model. 
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 7 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
 
Through this project, I seek to offer several important contributions the literatures 
on team innovation and team composition by offering a more balanced view that 
considers both the drawbacks and advantages of social hierarchies in teams. First, I 
extend the chain of insights on team innovation by explicitly considering how leaders 
might staff teams to foster innovation. This represents an area of research that has been 
largely neglected to date, with the noteworthy exceptions of studies on background and 
demographic diversity (e.g., Milliken & Martins, 2996; Shalley & Gilson, 2004), shared 
goals (e.g., Tjosvold, Tang, & West, 2004) and team size and tenure (e.g., Stewart, 2006). 
I consider how the composition of the social hierarchy, as influenced by the presence of 
high performers, shapes team processes. Second, my research responds to calls to address 
how social hierarchies can affect team performance by taking a more nuanced view of the 
nature of team performance. Decoupling the building blocks of team innovation enables 
consideration of how social hierarchy can be both functional and dysfunctional for teams 
who are focused on innovating. In doing so, I seek to offer a reconciliatory explanation 
for the inconsistent link between social hierarchy and team performance, or what others 
have referred to as “the innovation dilemma” (Zaltman, Duncan & Holbeck, 1973). 
SECTION 4.2. THE CONTRASTING EFFECTS OF SOCIAL HIERARCHY AND 
TEAM INNOVATION 




Unless all teammates are similarly high performing, the presence of a high 
performer in action teams heightens performance disparity, or the unequal dispersion of a 
valued resources or (i.e., one is privileged over many; Harrison & Klein, 2007). The 
addition of a high performer to the group, steepens status hierarchy among team member 
and, based on comparison, pushes others down the hierarchy. Disparity is highest in 
teams when all of a valued resource or asset is centralized with one member (Wasserman 
& Faust, 1994; see also DeRue, 2011). Performance disparity is at its maximum when the 
performance of one member meaningfully outranks other members (Harrison & Klein, 
2007). Higher performance disparity implies steeper stratification or social hierarchy 
(Grusky, 1994), which describe an implicit ranking of members with respect to their 
social value (e.g., performance contributions; Bales, 1958; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). 
Under such conditions, I expect lower-performing members experience reduced social 
motivation and less concerns about the social context since group order has been 
disambiguated by performance disparity (Mattick & Clark, 1998).  
Therefore, I propose that performance disparity constrains peers socially by 
introducing salient social hierarchy and reduce their social concerns. I characterize social 
concern as a form of activated social motivation that reflects the members’ elevated 
anxiety and socially facilitated motivation to engage. Consideration of meaningful team 
states generally assumes that collective perceptions need requisite time to emerge and 
need to be shared among members to be consequential to team performance (Kozlowski 
& Klein, 2000). Social concern in teams differs from neighboring constructs, such as 
psychological safety, which reflects a shared sense among members that it is safe to 




Specifically, members’ social concerns reflect an activated energy, heighted anxiety, 
discomfort and lack of ease. I expect that when members’ collective social concerns 
heighten, it will functionally it will influence team shared processes. To understand how 
social hierarchy and resulting social concerns shape team innovation requires separate 
consideration of it core components: team creativity and team idea implementation.  
To maximize innovative performance, teams must to create a balance social 
freedom to dynamically co-produce new, useful ideas—yet also achieve social order to 
efficacy implementation of those ideas into tangible products and services (West & Farr, 
1990). Therefore, a great idea that is poorly executed fails to qualify as innovation as 
does an unoriginal idea with exceptional execution. Rather, innovation requires 
seemingly contrasting team processes, which social hierarchy may simultaneously 
constrain and facilitate.  
The Creativity Path 
Team creativity is a necessary antecedent to team innovation (Zhou & Shalley, 
2008). Team creativity describes the “production of novel and useful ideas concerning 
products, services, processes, and procedures by a team of employees working together” 
(Shin & Zhou, 2007: 1715). When the creative process among teammates is at its best, it 
is all-absorbing (Csikszentmihalyi, 1997); however, social hierarchies in groups have 
been linked with “suppression of creativity” (Harrison & Klein, 2007: 1206). This is 
likely because team creativity requires divergent participation that includes fluid 
exchange of ideas, information, and insights across members (Paulus, Nakui, & Putman, 
2005; West, 1990).  




hierarchies pose a disadvantage to teams as they increase conformity, resentment, 
withdrawal, and deferral (e.g., Homans, 1961; Hollingshead, 1996; Pfeffer & Langton, 
1993) while decreasing exploration (e.g., Perretti & Negro, 2006). Consequently, flatter 
social hierarchies in teams may be more effective when team success depends upon 
tapping a broad range of opinions, experiences, and perspectives (Anderson & Brown, 
2010). Consistent with this view, more pronounced social hierarchies have prove to be 
problematic for team effectiveness by decreasing the quality of collaborative 
communication among members (e.g., Christie & Barling, 2010). 
Several studies offer evidence in support of this argument. For example, when 
high performers are present in the team, members have been found to overweight their 
ideas (Stasser & Birchmeier, 2003). Steeper hierarchies hinder critical thinking and the 
sharing of unique opinions (Tannenbaum, 1957). Further, status differences among 
members can constrain colleague interactions and prompt members to underweight the 
creative value of their peers (Milliken, Bartel, & Kurtzberg, 2003). Consequently, I 
expect that steeper status hierarchies triggered by performance disparity negatively 
related to divergent forms of team participation such as task conflict, because it reduces 
team members’ social motivation to contribute. 
Hypothesis 1. In action teams, (a) member performance disparity in teams negatively 
relates to divergent participation as reflected by team task conflict (b) mediated through 
its effect on social concerns among members.  
Creativity at the team level grows in complexity as members not only generate 
their own ideas, but also listen to others, integrate knowledge, and coordinate timing of 




production is cognitively demanding (Amabile, 1993) and requires dynamic, divergent 
participation (Zhou & Shalley, 2010). This includes being exposed to dissent and 
alternative ideas that can prompt creative thinking (Nemeth & Nemeth-Brown, 2003). 
Hypothesis 2. In action teams, divergent participation (i.e., team task conflict) positively 
relates to team creativity. 
 
The Implementation Path 
Implementing novel, useful ideas is what transforms team creativity into team 
innovation. Idea implementation requires that teams succeed in converting concepts, 
designs, and plans in to tangible reality. This process often involves skillful navigation of 
the social environment (Baer, 2012;	  Yuan & Woodman, 2010). Social hierarchies formed 
can helps teams by creating social order, simplifying interactions, and centralizing 
coordination (Halvey et al., 2011; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). This view is consistent with 
functional theories that contend that clear, pronounced hierarchies promote work 
efficiency and simplicity of communication (Anderson & Brown, 2010). In support of 
these arguments, review of the literature indicates that step social hierarchies help to 
reduce conflict, promote coordination, efficiently divide work, and improve decision-
making (Anderson & Brown, 2010; Gruenfeld & Tiedens, 2010; Halevy, Chou, & 
Galinsky, & Murnighan, 2012; Kelter, Gruenfled, & Anderson, 2003). For example, 
recent research showed social hierarchies can facilitates coordination among colleagues 
by establishing patterns of deference to one another (Kwaadsteniet & van Dijk; 2010) 
Greater social order among members can also clarify communication and 




process by which ideas are implemented. Rather than having to build consensus, teams in 
more pronounced hierarchies can make swift progress toward implementation by looking 
to the “most talented and capable members, who make more decisions for the group” 
(Anderson & Brown, 2010: 68). In the context of a hierarchy rather than flat team, lower-
performing members are more likely to cooperate with a higher performer due to his or 
her higher status and less likely to create conflict (Halevy et al., 2011). These processes, 
enabled by member reluctance to challenge and preference for deferral, promote 
convergent participation. 
Hypothesis 3. In action teams, (a) member performance disparity in teams positively 
relates to convergent participation as reflected by team coordination (b) mediated 
through its effect on social concerns among members.  
Effective implementation of creative ideas is maximized when teams can avoid 
process loss that occurs when communication breaks down or misunderstandings occur 
(Steiner, 1972). Navigating the idea implementation process requires deft coordination 
(i.e., orchestration and timing of members’ interdependent actions; Marks et al., 2001). 
Achieving clear, centralized agreement on teamwork processes enables more efficient 
implementation of ideas. A wealth of studies have offered compelling evidence that 
successful coordination of teamwork is paramount to team efficiency, production, and 
adaptation (e.g., Ancona & Caldwell, 1992a; 1992b; Pinto, Pinto, & Prescott, 1993; 
Reagans, Argote, & Brooks, 2005). 
Hypothesis 4. In action teams, convergent participation (i.e., team coordination) 
positively relates to team idea implementation. 





Purpose, Sample, & Design3 
I tested this model using a team experiment, in which I directly manipulated 
performance disparity within each team. Through random assignment and direct 
manipulation, this approach enabled me (1) to rule out the possibility of an omitted third 
variable affecting the relationships between focal variables (i.e., an endogeneity issue), 
and (2) to cleanly manipulate performance disparity to enable causal inference.  
Participants were undergraduates enrolled in management courses. The 
experiment took the form of a two-part, 2 condition (performance disparity: high versus 
low) between-team design. For Part 1, participants completed an individual online task 
(pre-survey assessment). For Part 2, participants came to the lab to complete an open-
ended innovative task in teams. Each three-member team was randomly assigned into 
condition prior to arriving at the lab. In total for Study E, I collected data from 210 
participants nested within 70 teams—35 teams per condition.  
Participants were incentivized to opt-in in order to fulfill a portion of the research 
requirement associated with their management course. To further motivate participation, 
students were informed that the top performing teams at the end of the semester earned 
$150 to divide among members ($50 per person). Cash was awarded the end of the 
semester to members of the five teams whose design was deemed to be most innovative, 
based on the ratings of the photo of their final product by three independent coders.  
Manipulation and Procedures 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Study E shares the task contexts of its experimental design with Study C; however, the experiments were 
run in separate semester, which minimized any samples overlap. Similarly, other than the manipulation, all 
variables used in Study C are distinct from those used in Study E. Lastly, they were each focused on 




For Part 1, participants were sent a link to their school email, inviting them to 
participate in a management research on leadership, innovation, and teamwork. If they 
elected to participate, they were asked to complete a survey and then work through a 
series of virtual tasks (e.g., the remote associates test; Mednick, 1962, unusual uses task; 
Guilford, 1967) in advance of coming to the lab. The survey explained that their 
performance in a series of tasks may impact their team when they come into the lab. The 
survey noted that the tasks are designed to be very challenging and measured “creative 
performance, strategic thinking, and innovative judgment.” Part 1 served two functions. 
First, it enabled collection of demographic and individual difference variables. Second, it 
offered a platform to give assessment-oriented tasks to the participants, which helped to 
legitimize the performance manipulation. 
Part 2 occurred in the research lab over the course of one hour. Upon coming to 
the lab, students were told that we were working with the School of Engineering to study 
the innovation process in teams. The experimenter asked participants to sign-in, escorted 
them each to a workstation, and asked them to read a task preview sheet (see Appendix 
C). The experimenter then reminded them of the series of online tasks they completed on 
“creative tasks, strategic thinking, and innovative judgment” and gave participants a 
manila envelope with their name on it. The envelope contained a report of their 
performance and summarized the performance of other members of their team. Similar to 
Study C, student performance reports were randomly assigned. In the control condition 
(i.e., no performance disparity), all students received a score of 3 of 10, as did their peers. 
In the experimental condition (i.e., performance disparity, one participant received a 9 of 




was generated for them by “Smith Cognitive Analytics” and that understanding the 
feedback may help them “figure out how to best operate as a team.” Several minutes 
later, participants are asked to join their team members at a conference table in the middle 
of the room. The experimenter explained to participants that they would be working 
together as a team to design an innovative product, asked them to take a minute or two to 
introduce themselves and to share Part 1 performance results.  
After this initial team discussion, the experimenter reviewed key aspects of the 
task sheet: that teams will be designing and constructing a model for an innovative, state-
of-the-art research facility in Greenland. The experimenter explained that they have 26 
minutes in total to complete the task, which would unfold in two phases. First, teams had 
ten minutes to collaborate on their teams design concept, after which the team would 
verbally describe—in two minutes—their overall design concept for the engineering 
judges (audio recorded). To facilitate the creative design process, the experimenter 
provided them with sketchpads and pencils. Second, they would have twelve minutes to 
refine and implement their concept, using materials that would be provided. Materials 
were comprised of building blocks of a variety of sizes and colors. Participants did not 
learn about the type of materials until the implementation phase of the experiment. After 
the implementation phase, they had another two minutes to present their final innovative 
model to the engineering judges (videotaped). Upon completion, team members were 
sent to their individual workstations and asked to complete a survey. 
I modeled this task after a study of teams by Woolley (2009), which also used 
building blocks as a way to create an open-ended task while not requiring specified 




study of collaboration within laboratory setting while still modeling tasks that are 
common to organizations: those in which members have limited resources (i.e., time and 
materials) and an overarching goal is set but discretion is left to the team as to how to 
achieve it.  
Measures 
All variable were operationalized at the team level of analysis. Unless specified 
differently, all measures relied upon a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1, disagree 
strongly, to 5, agree strongly.  Team process variables (i.e., task conflict and 
coordination) relied upon a direct-consensus composition model, using team as the 
referent (Chan, 1998).  
Social Concern in Teams. I rely upon the six work-relevant items from the social 
anxiety (i.e., activated social concern) subscale of the Social Interaction Anxiety scale 
(SAIS; Mattick & Clark, 1998). Sample items were “I have been worried about being 
ignored in the team”, “I was nervous to express my ideas or suggest alternative to my 
teammates,” and “I felt very at ease working with these team members” (reverse-coded). 
An increased sense of social concern and anxiety is a personal experience. While I 
proposed team members can collectively experience it based on the same stimulus to 
make it a collective experience, treating it as observable or measuring members’ 
perceptions of how others feel seems to disregard the core conceptual meaning of 
activated social concern. That is to say, in work teams social anxiety can be collectively 
higher, however, I do not conceptualize of it as a shared experience. Accordingly, I 
operationalized social concern in teams using a referent shift model in which the 




Team Task Conflict - Divergent participation. I assessed team task conflict using 
the 4-item scale crafted and validated by Jehn (1995). Indicators of this included 
“members disagreed about opinions regarding the activities being done,” “there was 
conflict about ideas in that team,” “there were differences of opinion in the team”, and 
“there was conflict about the decisions made in the team.”  Examination of aggregation 
statistics revealed that team membership explained 56% of the variance in team task 
conflict (ICC(1) = .56) and ICC(2) indicated acceptable reliability of team means ICC(2) 
= .304, F(68, 204) = 1.42, p < .05; Bryk & Raudenbuch, 1992; Bliese, 2000).  Additionally, 
data suggested good interrater agreement among teammates rwg = .88 (James, Demaree, 
Wolf; 1984; 1993). Taken in tandem, these statistics supported aggregation of individual 
member responses to task conflict to the team level. 
Team Coordination - Convergent participation. I captured convergent 
participation using Lewis’ (2005) measure of team coordination. Sample items included 
“our team works together in a well-coordinated fashion,” and “we accomplish tasks 
smoothly and efficiently.” Supported by aggregation statistics, I averaged team members’ 
ratings to reflect their team’s score. ICC(1) indicated that 67% variance in team 
coordination perceptions was attributable to team membership and ICC(2) indicated that 
team means were reliable (ICC(1) = .67; ICC(2) = .41, F(68, 204) = 1.71, p < .01; Bliese, 
2000). Members also showed agreement in their perceptions of team coordination, rwg = 
.93 (James, Demaree, Wolf; 1984; 1993).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 This ICC(2) value for Team Task Conflict is on the low end of the acceptable range.  This is likely due to 
the fact that team were similar in type and small in size (cf. Bliese, 2000; 2002). Joint evaluation of 




Team Innovation. Trained researchers, who were blind to hypotheses, used 
recorded portions of the session to code the two facets of team innovation—team 
creativity and team idea implementation. 
Team Creativity. The two-minute audio pitch (recorded at the midpoint of each 
team’s work session) served as the qualitative output used to code for team creativity. 
After listening to each team pitch, the three coders independently provided ratings for 
how effective the team was in creating a design concept that was (1) new and unique and 
(2) useful, using a 7-point scale for each dimension (-3 = ineffective, 3 = extremely 
effective). The two ratings were combined to represent the team’s overall creativity. I 
averaged across raters. A decision that aggregation statistics supported: rwg = .89 and 
ICC(2) = .87.  
Team Idea Implementation. At the end of each session, while the participants 
completed individual surveys of their experience in the team, experimenters took five 
photos of each model as constructed by building blocks (i.e., the top view and each of the 
four side-views of each model; see Appendix D for examples). Independently, coders 
reviewed these photos and watched the two-minute videos that teams recorded at the end 
of their implementation phase. Based of these qualitative inputs, coders rated each team 
based on how effective they were in implementing their design. Coders used the same 7-
point scale that ranged from -3, ineffective, to 3, extremely effective, and again achieved 
excellent agreement and reliability (rwg = .86; ICC(2) = .90).  Their ratings on team idea 





Table 14 summarizes means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations of 
all study variables at the team level. Two teams were omitted from analyses because each 
team had one member who had participated in a similar team simulation in the prior 
semester (i.e., Study D). The retained sample included 68 teams and a total of 204 
participants. Participants were 62% male and averaged 22.6 years of age.  
Manipulation Check 
I measured the effectiveness of the performance manipulation to ensure that the 
induced disparity was realized and perceived by participants. At the end of each session, I 
captured members’ recollection of the performance results that each member received 
from Part 1 of the study. Sample t-tests demonstrated that participants reported 
significantly higher past performance results for the designated high performer compared 
to themselves and their other peer in the experimental condition (M = .73 versus M = -
.77; range -1, low, to 1, high; t41 = 13.83, p < .001). In control group by contrast, peers 
did not report any meaningful past performance results differences between the focal and 
non-focal performers (M = -.89 versus M = -.92; t43 = 1.104, n.s.). Together, these 
estimates indicated that the manipulation successfully influenced peers’ perceptions of 
performance disparity.  
Hypothesis Testing – Hierarchical Regression 
As all variables operate within a single level of analysis, I tested hypotheses using 
hierarchical ordinary-least squares regression (OLS) and followed the approach specified 
by Aiken and West (1991). Table 15 summarizes these results. My hypotheses specified 
direction (i.e., positive or negative) of each relationship, a priori. Therefore, I relied upon 




Hypothesis 1a predicted that performance disparity would negatively relate to task 
conflict. Supporting this hypothesis, results demonstrated that performance disparity did 
indeed decrease team task conflict (β = -.36, p < .01). Hypothesis 1b further specified that 
negative impact of performance disparity on task conflict would be mediated by 
reduction in social concerns among members. Findings showed in teams with high 
performance disparity compared with teams with no disparity reported lower social 
concern (β = -.21, p < .05). However, the positive relationships between this activated 
social motivation and task conflict fell short of significant (β = .13, n.s.). Further, using 
the Monte Carlo method for assessing mediation (MCFAM), a bootstrap-based approach 
advocated by Mackinnon, Lockwood, and Williams (2004), I tested the indirect effect of 
performance and on team task conflict. The advantage of this approach over Sobel’s 
(1982) test of mediation is that it better accounts for the non-normal distribution of the 
a*b effect estimate (MacKinnon et al., 2004). I used the online tool created and describe 
by Selig and Preacher (2008), which facilitate estimation of a confidence interval in R. 
This effect trended negatively (-.03) but was not significant CI90 = [-.088; .012]. 
Therefore Hypothesis 1b was unsupported. 
Hypothesis 2 contended that divergent participation in the form of team task 
conflict would positively relate to team creativity, which received support (β = .36, p < 
.05). I also calculated the indirect effect of performance disparity on team creativity 
(through team task conflict). Analyses revealed a significant, negative indirect effect       
(-.16; CI90 = [-.31; -.05]).  
Hypothesis 3a stated that performance disparity would positively relate to team 




relationship between performance disparity and team coordination (β = .20, p < .05). 
Hypothesis 3b expected that the positive impact of performance disparity on team 
coordination would be mediated by social concerns, such that greater disparity reduces 
social motivation due to increased social order, which in turn, increases team 
coordination. First, using the traditional approach to mediation (i.e., Baron & Kenny, 
1986), I assessed the relationship between performance disparity and social concerns, 
which was significantly negative (β = -.21, p < .05. Then, I tested the relationship 
between performance disparity and team coordination first without and then with the term 
for social concerns. Findings revealed that the significant, positive relationship between 
performance disparity and team coordination became non-significant when accounting 
for social concerns in the team. Next, I examined the indirect effects using the approach 
discussed above. Tests indicated a significant, positive indirect effect (.10; CI90 = [.002; 
.209]), which offered support to Hypothesis 3b.  
Lastly, Hypothesis 4 stated that convergent participation in the form of team 
coordination would positively relate to team idea implementation, which findings 
supported (β = .31, p < .05).  
DISCUSSION 
Theoretical Contributions and Practical Implications 
With this study and developing essay, I sought to take a step forward in 
addressing the innovation dilemma. I proposed and found that performance disparity 
reduced divergent participation (i.e., team task conflict) and increased convergent 
participation (i.e., team coordination), which translated into less creativity but greater 




increase in team coordination could be explained by reduced social concerns felt by 
members. Team members reported less social attention and motivation when there was a 
clearer status hierarchy based on performance differentiation. The study and findings 
contribute to knowledge on team innovative processes, composition of innovation teams, 
and performance differentiation.  
First, this study contributes to the team innovation literature by highlighting 
contrasting processes that differentially impact the key elements of innovation: creativity 
and idea implementation. Innovation researchers acknowledge that understanding team 
processes that drive successful innovation is critical for organizational success and 
sustained effectiveness (Anderson et al., 2004; Klein & Sorra, 1996; Zhou & Shalley, 
2010). In kind, increased attention has been paid to examination of team-level inputs and 
resultant team processes (Hülshelger et al., 2009). What remains absent from the 
scholarly conversation about antecedent to innovation is consideration of the social 
dynamics and states that affect task processes.  This study underscored the importance of 
recognizing the impact of a social hierarchy and resulting social concerns of team 
members, which broadens understanding of a collectives state that both fuels or inhibits 
development of team processes.  
Second, this study contributes to literature on how status differentiation explains 
psychological states and processes in collective units of work (i.e., groups and teams). 
Joining work on social hierarchies by Christie and Barling (2010), who linked 
performance-based status inequality in teams to absenteeism and team member health, 
the theoretical and empirical account offered here suggests that performance-based status 




further examination to deepen theoretical understand of how performance differentiation 
affect socio-emotional states and interpersonal interactions especially in teams in which 
members’ work is highly interdependence and interactions are frequent.  
Third, this inquiry joins and extends the innovation literature by considering how 
composition of members can meaningfully impact innovation and creativity. Evidence 
from recent research has highlighted the need to understand this link better, showing that 
team composition plays an influential role on team innovation. For example a multi-
method study showed gender composition interacts with competitive dynamics to reduce 
creativity (Baer, Vadera, Leeanders, & Oldham, 2014). In her examination of deep-level 
compositional differences, Post (2012) found that the composition of cognitive style in 
teams significantly impacted their ability to innovate. Still, when considering the 
cumulative body of work team innovation, while studies have consider the effect of 
leaders (e.g., Chen et al., 2013: Eisenbeiss, van Knippenberg, & Boerner, 2008) and of 
resources (e.g., Anderson et al., 2004) on team innovation, there remains very little 
cumulative knowledge on how to compose team who are more predisposed to 
development of processes key to innovation. This works seeks to redress this clear gap.  
Limitations and Future Research 
Limitations of this study create avenues for future inquiry.  First, I considered it 
important to examine the focal phenomenon initially in a controlled setting—especially 
in a setting where team resources do not vary and the innovative objective remains the 
same. However, while greater internal validity is an advantage to this approach, it is at 
the cost of high confidence in external validity. I tried to minimize this by creating a 




product something tangible, had clear deliverables that they understood would be 
evaluated, and also received clear incentives for being successful. Even so, the lab setting 
inherently limits psychological realism and future research to assess this model in 
alternative settings would bolster confidence that results would generalize broadly.  
Related, I have secured commitment to conduct a second study in engineering firm, 
examining how team composition effects innovative success of R&D teams.  
Second, while outside of the scope for this last essay, it would be interesting 
explore whether team interventions that emphasize the unique strengths of individual 
members would change the social space to influence team development and processes 
that affect team innovation. Particularly, how can we cultivate social motivation while 
reducing uncertainty of how members can contribute?  This may promote team 
innovation through greater divergent participation while not at the expense of convergent 
participation. Roberts, Dutton, Spreitzer, Heaphy, & Quinn, 2005). Most socialization 
efforts err toward imprinting the goals and reputation of the collective in the hearts and 
minds of new members; though, research suggests that efforts to spark early discussion of 
individual strengths—and encouragement of members to apply their strengths—increase 
employee engagement (Cable, Gino, & Staats, 2013). It would be interesting to examine 
how a strengths-based team socialization—compared with those that emphasize team 
goals—could buffer members from the negative effects of social hierarchies. 




CHAPTER 4: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In management research, the outcome variable of choice is performance. 
Organizational leaders and academicians alike spend substantial time trying to understand 
how to attract, motivate, incentivize, train for, and enable higher individual performance. 
While individual performance at work is a core building block of organizational success, 
examination of its antecedents has eclipsed study of its consequences. The pursuit of 
what drives performance seems to have also left us satisfied with getting to performance. 
This dissertation departs from the dominant paradigm, seeking to understand the effects 
of performance.  
Ignoring consequences of performance seems riskier as the nature of work grows 
more collaborative. Increasingly, employees are asked to share, co-produce, and 
cooperate. Researchers are asked to forge interdisciplinary ties and answer broader 
research questions. In the U.S., work is steadily shifting from manufacturing sectors to 
service sectors. With the globalization of work, problems and missions grow more 
complex, which requires broader expertise. These trends illustrate increasingly relational 
models, where interactions and social context become more relevant to employee 
motivation and success.  Consequently, it seems limiting to treat individual performance 
as the distal outcome—the end of the story—or consider individual performance separate 
from that of colleagues.  Rather, we need to understand how relative performance 
difference can spark outcomes, especially negative outcomes that leaders and performers 
may not expect.   
In this dissertation, I shift the focus from what affects individual performance to 




this, these three essays acknowledged and emphasized the critical features of relative 
performance (i.e., members’ performance compared to those in the group and 
performance disparity). With these essays, I explore unintended consequences of higher 
performers. Integrating different theoretical perspectives, I offer theoretical and empirical 
accounts that underscore why being mindful of performance differentiation in teams can 
advantage leaders and performers. These essays span levels of analysis, with each 
shifting the locus of the investigation to a different consequence: social, motivational, and 
interactional. I used different operationalizations of high performance (i.e., supervisor 
ratings and performance feedback). I examine different psychological and behavioral 
reactions based on performance differentiation (i.e., cognitive appraisal, social treatment, 
motivational states, and team processes). I also tested my predictions across several 
different task contexts using field, individual experiments, and team experiments that 
placed participants in real and simulated teams. Participants’ incentives, domain-relevant 
expertise, and goals varied broadly between these contexts. Findings addressed many 
unanswered questions about the consequences resulting from higher performing members 
in workgroup, and also reveal other surprising effects and important questions that I am 
excited to pursue in future work. Collectively, results indicate that high performers have 
substantial, meaningful impact across variety of contexts—and not always as business 
leaders are likely to expect. Taken together, these findings suggest that relative 
performance in a collective work environment carries important implications for broader 
colleague interactions and motivations.   
Essay 1 and 2 consider ways in which higher performers affect peer behaviors.  




their peers. A pilot inquiry, a field study, and an experimental study in the context of 
teams indicated that high performers are considered simultaneously more beneficial and 
more threatening to work resources. Evidence suggested that peers are more likely to 
undermine higher performing colleagues due, in part, to their own appraisal of how the 
high performer will impact resources. Whether or not peers supported higher performers 
varied across our contexts: high performers received less social support in the field and 
more task support in lab teams. This may point to peers choosing to support higher 
performers when that support is more instrumental to collective success (i.e., task-related) 
rather than for the benefit of the higher performer (i.e., socio-emotional in nature). I 
examined whether more cooperative work environments could improve social treatment 
of higher performers, but results from two different contexts showed the opposite: higher 
performing coworkers were penalized more in more cooperative climates.   
Building on Essay 1, Essay 2 also focused on peer behavior but turned the tables 
to answer a related question: how does the presence of a high performer affect peers 
motivation. Across two studies, I investigated how a high performer can shift the context 
and constrain peers’ motivation to take initiative. Specifically, this inquiry considered 
how high performers can reduce motivation for peers who are naturally more proactive 
(i.e., high on disposition personal initiative). Findings converged to indicate that high 
performers may serve as social cues that strain peers’ proactive motivation to contribute. 
These results carry potentially important implications for staffing and team composition. 
For instance, adding a high performer to a team could increase social loafing from other 




Shifting vantage points from individuals to teams, Essay 3 considers how 
performance disparity created by the presence of a high performer shapes team 
interactions. Evidence from a team experiment suggested that the presence of a high 
performer can reduce social motivation (i.e., social concerns among members). Further, 
performance disparity resulted in less team creativity (through task conflict) but more 
team idea implementation (through team coordination). Creativity and implementation, 
together, form the bedrock of innovation. Individually, each is necessary but insufficient 
to constitute innovation. Therefore, it is interesting that performance disparity seems to 
have contrasting effects on these core features of innovation. As formal differentiation in 
work teams is commonplace, it seems important to understand how to create team 
environments to fuel creativity. This seems especially true since results found that even 
informal differentiation (i.e., based on performance) reduced creative co-production. 
Conversely, findings indicated that flatter, self-managed teams in which there is 
relatively less differentiation on vertical differences, may have the upper hand in design 
of creative concepts; however, such groups may struggle to bring their ideas to fruition 
with efficiency and sufficient coordination.  
As a collective, these essays highlight that high performers earn and pose 
consequences at work in ways that business and HR leaders may never expect. Findings 
begin to offer a more complete picture of unintended consequences of high performers. 
Certainly, there is benefit to hire, staff, and retain high performing employees. However, 
transplanting them into a workgroup or including them in a new team without taking 
relative performance difference into consideration may bare inadvertent effects—for the 




and practice, it seems critical to consider the effects of relative differences in 
performance across unit-members. With the rise of more collective, relational models of 
work, it seems especially timely to advance understanding of such effects.   
Future Research 
Though this emerging program of research has revealed multiple consequences of 
high performers, there are many related and interesting questions that remain 
unanswered. For example, what types of environments or leader behaviors can improve 
social treatment of higher performers?  Since cooperative climates seem to exacerbate 
unfavorable treatment of higher performers, are there other climates that can improve it? 
How are higher performers distinct from stars (i.e., those at the extreme positive end of 
the performance spectrum; cf. Groysberg, 2010)? The relationship between performance 
and social treatment may be curvilinear, which more data may help to inform. Recent 
evidence shows that individuals whose performance level falls at the tails of the spectrum 
are more likely to be treated poorly by colleagues (Janssen et al., 2014). Moreover, how 
does the relative performance between colleagues shape behavior?  I reanalyzed data 
from Essay 1 at the dyadic level and results mirrored that at the individual-level, with the 
exception of the perceived benefit-social support link, which was non-significant.  
However, I am interested to explore this further and understand how the content and 
strength of the ties between two colleagues may shift as a function of their performance 
levels and performance differences.  
In Essay 2, personal initiative and social inhibition substantially varied across 
contexts with and without a high performer but in a manner other than predicted. This has 




instance, based on social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954), we may expect that high 
performer creates an unfavorable comparison process for peers, triggering a prevention 
focus to minimize further shortcomings.  In contrast, based on principals of goal-setting 
theory (cf. Locke & Latham 2002), a high performer may create a higher aspirational 
standard, which may motivate peers to strive for improved performance and focus on 
achievement rather than prevention. I pursue these questions in other research, guided by 
theories of regulatory focus (Higgins, 1997; 2000). Early evidence suggests that, 
individual propensity toward promotion versus prevention focus affects whether high 
performers fuel or hamper peer motivation.     
In Essay 3, I contrasted the ends of the disparity spectrum (i.e., no disparity, high 
disparity) as an initial test. However, it would be interesting to examine linear and non-
linear effects by modeling effects using the full spectrum of performance differentiation.  
In follow-up research, I am measuring performance differentiation as a continuous 
variable to understand the nuances of the disparity-team process relationship across the 
continuum. In addition, I am fascinated by team development interventions that may help 
teams with performance disparity to still dynamically co-create in divergent ways 
necessary for creativity. Namely, I am looking at ways in which salience of horizontal 
differences among members (i.e., variety) reduce the salience of vertical differences that 
results from performance differentiation (i.e., disparity).  
In conclusion, examining high performers in the context of collective work, I 
sought to paint a more complete picture of performance consequences. The three essays 
of this dissertation take important steps forward in revealing largely ignored effects of 




composition in collective work units. Evidence suggests that leaders pursuing of high 
performers should not infer their value in isolation, rather consider it as part of a broader, 
social system.  If not, they may be doing themselves a disservice. I hope my developing 
research program continues to contribute insights and prompts further investigations that 
enrich understanding of consequences sparked by high performers. 
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Appendix A: Pilot Study Scenario – The Case of Solutions Inc. (Essay 1) 
 
Background. You work at Solutions Inc., a mid-size consulting firm that focuses on data 
analytics. Your firm helps clients tackle business problems by researching the issues, collecting 
and analyzing data, recommending potential solutions to your clients, and helping clients 
implement their preferred solution. Solutions Inc. has been steadily growing because it has 
developed a good reputation. Reputation is important in this industry.  
  
Your workgroup (i.e., you and your colleagues) work at the consulting firm headquarters while 
your company’s consultants work at different client sites to implement projects. Your workgroup 
at headquarters serves a key function: you’re responsible for coordinating projects, selling new 
work to clients, and attracting new clients. It is critical to keep clients happy and make sure 
projects are running efficiently and effectively. 
 
Your Responsibilities, Rewards, and Performance. At Solutions Inc., each client project is 
managed individually by one member of your workgroup—unless a client project is complex or 
very large. Things can get hectic because you and your colleagues typically each oversee between 
6-8 client projects at once. Good coordination is crucial. So, you and your colleagues try to share 
knowledge, exchange tips for how to serve clients, and help each other when things get busy.  
  
The Director of the workgroup chooses who gets to manage each new client project. The Director 
selects based on who has availability and who may best serve the client and expand the account. 
 
You think most colleagues in your workgroup view you as a competent employee. Your annual 
performance evaluations usually rate your performance as average within the group. You’ve had 
a good experience at Solutions Inc. and think there may be future opportunities to steadily 
advance your career here. 
 
Colleagues. Two of your colleagues are quite different. Jordan is viewed as a higher performer 
and Taylor is viewed as a lower performer. In their annual performance evaluations, Jordan 
received above-average ratings while Taylor received below-average ratings. The objective 
components of their evaluations are below. This was what you expected based on observations. 
For example, Jordan wrote several business proposals that were excellent and also had several 
very well coordinated client projects. In contrast, Taylor wrote several business proposals that 






Appendix B: Performance Manipulation in Virtual Team Simulation for Study B 






Appendix C: Study D (Essay 2) & Study E (Essay 3) Task Sheet  
Team: ______________________ 
Team Participant Number:  Pre-survey Results:  Member Name: 
______________   ______________   __________________________ 
______________   ______________   __________________________ 
______________   ______________   __________________________ 
Task: 
Your team has just been selected as one of the finalists to bid for a multi-million dollar 
construction contract. The project is a state-of-the-art research facility in Greenland that will house a high-
tech firm named GEO. GEO’s mission is to develop innovative solutions for exploring extreme 
environments, both on Earth and in space. 
 
Your task is to design a research facility model with strong innovative design features that will 
win the contract bid. Success is crucial, because you’ve heard, through your professional network, that your 
chief competitor has a ground-breaking model that not only is likely to appeal to decision-makers at GEO, 
but also may revolutionize the field of environmental architecture. Coming up with a better innovative 
design to win the contract is therefore critical for your engineering firm’s long-term success.  
 
Many details about what top GEO executives envision for their future facility remain top secret. 
However, below are several of their goals for the facility that may help boost your score, if you incorporate 
them. You can also consider aspects of the environment in Greenland that may help your design.  
 
Structural & Environmental Elements:  
1. In past contracts, GEO Executives have usually preferred a non-standard architectural style.  
 
2. One stream of GEO’s research will focus on capturing data on the Northern Lights in the sky. The best 
photos will be those taken from higher off the ground. Consider this when determining the highest 
point(s) of your model (i.e., how high that floors or building features will go). 
 
3. Revolutionary research will occur in the facility, so it is likely to receive media attention. It will make 
both your firm and CEO look good to have a facility that balances structural integrity with beauty (i.e., 
represents an architectural ‘work of art’). 
 
4. Greenland does not enable a lot of coming and going. Therefore, the facility will have to be “all-in-
one”: researchers will both have to live and work in the facility. Please consider how to offer a balance 
of rooms that include living quarters, research labs, and a place to house machinery and generators. 
 
5. It is always below freezing in this region of Greenland. Maximizing the number of external walls will 
facilitate geothermal heating systems within the facility. 
 
6. The research facility will face strong Arctic winds, so using landscaping and/or structural elements to 
protect the research facility will help the site save energy. 
Note: Please create a design that facilitates cross-sectional examination of your proposed architectural 
model (i.e., no roofing is required). 
Engineering faculty will judge your design. Innovative designs will utilizes materials creatively and 
incorporate novel and useful design elements. The more design elements you integrate in an innovative 
way, the more likely your model will win the construction bid (and end-of-semester cash prize--$150 to 
the TOP TWO TEAMS between now and 4/10). Good luck! 
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Appendix D: Study F (Essay 3) Representative Examples Innovative Structure 
Ratings 
 

























































Table 1. Pilot Study (Essay 1) Summary Statistics. 
 
 
     *p < .05  










   Note. Correlations displayed at the individual level. N = 300 individuals nested within 80 work groups (salons); workgroup-level 
   means assigned down to individual group members; internal consistencies (alphas) display diagonally. 
 *p < .05  
**p < .01 
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Individual - Level 1
1 Manager-rated performance 3.51 0.82  (.93)
2 Relative manager-rated performance 0.00 0.54    .66** --
3 Age 28.07 6.65    .20**    .30** --
4 Tenure (in months) 76.24 58.63    .19**    .15**   .59** --
5 Education 2.10 0.42  -.13* -.09  -.21**  -.16** --
6 Prosocial motives 4.07 0.56 .05 .11 .04 -.01   .05  (.91)
7 Perceived benefit to resources 3.49 0.56    .17**    .20** .05  .13*   .12*  .02 (.79)
8 Perceived threat to resources 2.94 0.50 .09 .10   .17**  .13* -.04 -.03    .15** (.72)
9 Social support 3.51 0.72 -.02 -.07  -.17** -.13*  .05  .14*  .13* -.20** (.92)
10 Social undermining 1.77 0.79 -.04 -.03  .07* .08 -.02   -.18** -.10*   .24** -.28** (.95)
Work Group - Level 2
11 Cooperative climate 3.92 0.38 -.03 .00 -.05 -.06 -.06    .24**  .29** -.06   .22**  -.28** (.81)
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Table 3. Study A (Essay 1) Hierarchical Linear Regression Results 
 
Note. N (Level 1) = 300; N (Level 2 = 80). Coefficient estimations are fixed effects gammas (γ) with robust standard errors. Hypothesized coefficients bolded.  
a Sum of total variance attributable to within and between variance components (Snijders & Bosker, 1999). Decomposed as: 
b R(Level 1)2 = 1 – [(σ2 of current model + τ00 of current model) / (σ2 of null model + τ00 of null)] 
c R(Level 2)2 for the intercept = (τ00 of current model / average n) + σ2 of current model] / [(τ00 of null model / average n) + σ2 of null model] 
d R(Level 2)2 for the slopes of perceived benefit and threat = τ of benefit/threat slope in model without predictor compared to τ of slope of benefit/threat in model 
with cooperative climate 
  †p < .10   
  *p < .05   
 **p < .01   
***p < .001  
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Table 4. (Study A) Effects of Relative Performance on Peer Perception of Threat and Social Undermining at High and Low 
Levels of Performer Prosocial Motives 
 
 
     *p < .05  
    **p < .01 
	  
Table 5. Study A (Essay 1) Effects of Relative Performance on Peer Perception of Benefit and Social Support at High and Low 
Levels of Cooperative Climate 
 
     *p < .05  

















Table 8. Relative Performance on Social Undermining Responses at High and Low 
















































Table 16. Key Concepts and Definitions. 
	  
Essay 1  
Concept Definition 
Individual Performance Degree of proficiency and quality in employees’ accomplishment of tasks specific to their role and contextually-relevant contributions 
(Campbell, McCloy, Oppler, & Sager, 1993; Griffin et al., 2007) 
Perceived Threat to 
Work Resources 
Evaluation that a colleague puts at risk your access to social and material resources (adapted from Spreitzer, 1996) 
Perceived Benefit to 
Work Resources 
Evaluation that a colleague augments and facilitates your access to social and material resources at work (adapted from Spreitzer, 1996) 
Social Support Intentional behaviors extended to others for fostering positive interpersonal relationships (Duffy, Ganster, & Pagon, 2002) 
Social Undermining Intentional efforts to impede others’ ability to establish and sustain effective interpersonal relationships, to achieve work success, and to 
maintain a strong reputation (Duffy et al., 2002) 




Shared perceptions among workgroup members that collective objectives and mutual interests should be pursued (Chatman & Flynn, 
2001) 
	  
Essay 2  
Concept Definition 
Personal Initiative 	   Akin to proactive disposition, personal initiative reflects individuals’ natural propensity toward behaviors that are self-starting, 
proactive, and persistent in overcoming barriers  (Frese & Fey, 2001) 
Proactive Motivation Employees’ beliefs of their interests and capacity to prompt change in their work (Parker, Bindl, & Strauss, 2010) 
   Analytic Self-efficacy Employees’ believe in their capacity to perform well in an analytical task (adapted from creative self efficacy; Tierney & Farmer, 2002)  
   Felt Responsibility Employees’ view of their personal accountability in a task. (Hackman & Oldham, 1976; 1980; Morrison & Phelps, 1999) 
   Social Inhibition Employees’ state of feeling reserved, lack of comfort, and self-consciousness, which prevents behaving in a relaxed, natural way. (Daly 
& Stafford, 1994; Mattick & Clark, 1998). 
Proactive Performance Individual behavior that initiates change, is self-starting, and future oriented toward a better way of doing things (Griffin et al., 2007) 
Status The amount of respect, influence, and prominence individuals have in the eyes of others (Anderson et al. 2001, Flynn 2003), which 
signals an important positional element in the social structure (Washington & Zajac, 2005) 
	  




Essay 3  
Concept Definition 
Performance Disparity The extent to which the quality of performance attributed to individuals in a group is dispersed, capturing the pattern and 
distribution of group member performance differences. 
Social Hierarchy Implicit ranking of individuals with respect to their social value (Bales, 1958; Magee & Galinsky, 2008)  
Social concern in teams A feeling among members of the team of increased social ambiguity and social anxiety, activated social attention to the social 
context (Mattick & Clark, 1998). 
Team Divergent Participation Exchange of differing information, alternative ideas, opposing views, and differing insights across members of a team 
   Task Conflict Member disagreement over ideas and opinions related to accomplishing the group’s task (Jehn, 1995; 1997) 
Team Convergent participation Efficient exchange of inputs and outputs, harmonization and coalescence of efforts, and efficient synchronization of of efforts 
and ideas.    
   Coordination  Teams’ orchestration of the “sequence and timing of interdependent actions” (Mark, Mathieu, & Zaccaro, 2001: 363). 
Team Innovation Teams’ (1) development of novel, useful ideas and (2) successful implementation of those ideas into tangible products and 
services (West & Farr, 1990). 
   Team Creativity Production of novel and useful ideas concerning products, services, processes, and procedures by a team of employees 
working together (Shin & Zhou, 2007: 1715 
   Idea Implementation  The extent to which teams succeed in converting ideas and plans in to tangible reality, which involves navigation of a socio-
political process (adapted from Baer, 2012)  
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Figure 2. Study A Simple Slopes of Interactions (Essay 1) 
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